Re: Running PGP on Netcom (and Similar)

[Adam Shostack <adam@bwh.harvard.edu>]

| > >	Then, when logged in from a line being sniffed, you would
| > >invoke PGP -1es ..., and when prompted for your pass phrase you would
| > >enter 800/something-ugly-that-md5-makes.  PGP would then md5 this 200
| > >times, and you'd have demonstrated your knowledge of your passphrase
| > >without ever sending it over a line.  Clearly, PGP would need to store
| > >the fact that you had used #800, and only accept lower numbers.

| I can see how this gets around the problem of sending cleartext 
| passphrases over a network, but how does it help stop the problem of the 
| remote system running a keystroke log that is handed over to the 
| authorities during a bust?  Armed with 800/some-number they can just type 
| the same thing into PGP (or a modified copy) and decrypt the files that 
| you were keeping on-line.

	If they are logging everything, then they have the output of
your PGP-decryptions.  Unavoidable.  

	If all they have is the 800th md5 of your passphrase, then
they have a $10m route of attack.  PGP will reject the 800th+ md5 of
your passphrase.  They need the 799th or lower to get your key.  The
800th will be rejected by PGP as already used.  (It would have to be
hashed into your keys somehow to avoid the attackers from just
resetting the number.  They might be able to do that with backup
tapes, old copies of your keys, etc.)

	This addresses some attacks; those based on network sniffing.
Attackers with more resources, such as law enforcement, are
inconvinienced, perhaps greatly, but not thwarted.  J. Random Cracker
using network sniffing is thwarted, and I think that in itself is
worthwhile.

Adam