Re: On the crime bill and remailers

[John Young <jya@pipeline.com>]

Responding to msg by tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) on Tue, 
20 Sep 10:40 AM


>I agree with Hal Finney's point that current remailers 
>are far from  the "ideal mix" described by Chaum and 
>are basically not very good at  what they are supposed 
>to do.

[Snip]

>[Hal says]
>> Claims here that remailers are designed to support sedition 
or to
>> prevent government surveillance are both wrong and harmful.  
This kind
>> of material could show up at some future prosecution of a 
remailer
>> operator.

[Snip]

[Tim says]
>Maybe. This is why I brought up the "supporting 
>terrorists" language  of the Crime Act.


Hal and Tim point to the vulnerability of the person running 
the remailer to being threatened through the equipment owner 
(like John Perry's recent experience) or squeezed by government 
agents into playing along with surveillors.

This isolation and elimination (or co-optation) of a target has 
worked again and again to destroy networks once they become 
serious threats to law and order.

Hal's warning is wisely heeded until all the remailer 
beneficiaries are bear an equal share of the risks of being 
charged a "supporting terrorist".


John