Re: ANON: Chaining suggestions

[Eli Brandt <ebrandt@jarthur.Claremont.EDU>]

> From: Hal <74076.1041@CompuServe.COM>
> I don't think the idea quite works in this form, since I don't see how 
> messages to Julf get translated to an12345.  Presumably only messages 
> from one specific user should get posted under this ID (the user whose 
> address is buried in the encrypted return address to which Julf's 
> remailer will forward replies).  Perhaps another set of commands is 
> needed to tell the remailer what ID to use to post under.

I don't know what Eric was thinking, but I was thinking as follows:
  * I send a message to the nymserver, telling it to create a nym
entry.  The body of the message is a public key.  All further
commands to the server must be signed by this key.
  * I then send a message to the nymserver, telling it to add a
return block to the nym's list of return addresses.  (signed)
  * Another (signed) command sets up a human-readable name, if I
wish.  Now we're in business.

  * Joe User sends a message to eli-alias@nymserver.  The server
looks up eli-alias, picks the preferred return path, and richochets
the message out.
  * or, I tell the nymserver to post vitriol to alt.fan.clinton
under the name "eli-alias".  Again, the command must be correctly
signed.

(Can PGP let me rename my eli-alias private key to something
innocuous -- like "test3"?  This would provide some deniability if
they seize my secring.pgp -- they need no passphrase to see the
names of the keys on it.  Denied this information, can `they'
associate private and public keys in some way?)

Hopefully, all commands to the nymserver would be encrypted with its
public key.  They might well be bounced to it through anonymous
remailers, or sent with whatever other anonymity tech -- such as
DC-nets -- is available.  Yanek, were you setting up an experimental
DC-net?  How's it look?

Any holes here?  The requirement of a signature on all commands is
parallel to the present use of a password, but far more secure.  It
provides continuity of identity, rather than the present use of
return address.  Attack this protocol, folks.

Now, this does look like a lot of hair to add to penet.  Maybe I
should learn perl and write a remailer.  Heh.

(Aside: anybody here running linux?  Do you know of a
non-destructive repartitioner?)

> Hal Finney

   Eli   ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu
(with a big disk and a small flaky tape drive)