RE: Work the Work!

[fergp@sytex.com (Paul Ferguson)]

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Date: Tue, 1 Jun 93 21:32:24 -0700
 Eric Hughes <uunet!soda.berkeley.edu!hughes> wrote -
 
> Paul, you of all people don't need to feel slighted when I urge
> people to do something, anything, about the wiretap chips.
 
 Agreed. There are many, many things that we need to do to support
 opposition to this ruse.
 
> Here is my own very short version of my policy toward the wiretap
> chips:
 
> "The government has no right to restrict my use of cryptography in
> any way.  They may not forbid me to use whatever ciphers I may like,
> nor may they require me to use any that I do not like."
 
 Hear, hear.
 
 
> The hypothetical backdoor in clipper is a charlatan's issue by
> comparison, as is discussion of how to make a key escrow system
> 'work.'  Do not be suckered into talking about an issue that is not
> important.  If someone want to talk about potential back doors, refuse
> to speculate.  The existence of a front door (key escrow) make back
> door issues pale in comparison.
 
> If someone wants to talk about how key escrow works, refuse to
> elaborate.  Saying that this particular key escrow system is bad has a
> large measure of complicity in saying that escrow systems in general
> are OK.  Always argue that this particular key escrow system is bad
> because it is a key escrow system, not because it has procedural
> flaws.
 
> This right issue is that the government has no right to my private
> communications.  Every other issue is the wrong issue and detracts
> from this central one.  If we defeat one particular system without
> defeating all other possible such systems at the same time, we have
> not won at all; we have delayed the time of reckoning.
 
 Very lucid and wise observation. I have suggested several times that
 attention should also be directed to the (what I call) "potential
 factor" in regards to the entire "key escrow" system. The potential
 for abuse and unconstitutional invasions of personal privacy are ripe
 for the picking under this scheme. In my own public comment letter to
 the Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board, I stressed
 this fact and also pointed out that although the system was probably
 designed with good intentions (right), it will not prevent zealots
 and spooks from monitoring communications under certain
 circumstances.
 
 My other peeve is that after this "technology" has been entrenched
 (read: forced) on the public, I see the rug being pulled out from
 under the feet of any other crypto system available. That's also why
 I attach a great deal of importance to some form of PGP being
 developed where all parties (Phil Z., Jim B., and me) are happy
 (excluding Uncle S.). (But I suppose that's another topic...)
 
 Patriotically yours,
 
 
 
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Paul Ferguson               |  The future is now.
Network Integrator          |  History will tell the tale;
Centreville, Virginia USA   |  We must endure and struggle
fergp@sytex.com             |  to shape it.
 
          Stop the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip.