Lobbying for Cryptoprivacy, non-U.S.

[Eric Hughes <hughes@soda.berkeley.edu>]

>>* Be careful with the wording of the legislation; be sure to
>>  specify *key-escrow* and not any other forms of cryptography.

>This is extremely dangerous.  Much of legislation is compromise.  Any
>such bill is probably so close to a bill that outlaws cryptography (or
>could be interpreted as a precedent for such a bill) 

The point Dean makes is important.  You want a positive right for
individuals to use cryptography in any form, not just a 'negative
right' which restricts government from creating key registration
requirements.  Such a positive right will _a fortiori_ exclude key
escrow systems, and that's what you want.  You want to make sure that
all _restrictions_ on cryptography are disallowed, that there are no
_restricted_ forms of cryptography.  The point is subtle, but
profound.  Both techniques get rid of key registration, but one is a
restriction on cryptography and the other is not.

There is another point to remember about constitutional democracies.
That which the legislature may do, the legislature may also undo.  The
level at which the prohibition against cryptography restrictions is
appropriate is at the constitutional level.  A constitutional
provision binds the government; lesser solutions are less effective,
even when they should be sought out as intermediaries.

At the first CFP conference, Lawrence Tribe made this point extremely
well, that the fundamental right of citizens should be invariant to
technology.

Eric