Wayner's Wonderland

[an12070@anon.penet.fi]

Mr. Wayner posts thoughtful descriptions and reflections on the CSSPAB
proceedings. While I want to express my appreciation for this
interesting and revealing glimpse and encourage future postings in the
same vein, there are some deeply upsetting views and grating,
gratuitous benedictions expressed therein that would sound worse than
fingernails on a chalkboard for any hard core cypherpunk. Following is
mostly vitriolic and sarcastic flame; feel free to ignore it; you've been warned.

* * *

Peter Wayner <pcw@access.digex.net>
>The board itself runs with a quasi-legal style 

quasi-legal? and the NSA was there? how apropos!

>All of them came from the upper
>ranks of the military or legal system and a person doesn't rise to
>such a position without adopting the careful air of the very diligent
>bureaucrat.

This is precisely the fluffery and facade we are *not* impressed with.
The very Cream of the NSA, the brilliant minds who brought you Clipper and DSA.

>The NSA has rarely had trouble in the past
>exercising either its explicitly granted legal authority  or
>its implied authority. The phrase "national security" is a
>powerful pass phrase around Washington and there is no reason
>for me to believe that the NSA wouldn't get all of the access
>to the escrow database that it needs [...]

but you see, that is the problem. As P. Ferguson wrote, ` `National
security': the root password to the Constitution.'

>Building in
>a backdoor would only leave a weakness for an opponent to exploit
>and that is something that is almost as sacrilidgeous at the NSA
>as just putting the classified secrets in a Fed Ex package to 
>Saddam Hussein.

Hm, do you think they felt the same about DES? DSA? decreasing key size
makes me wonder at night...

>Next there was a report from Geoff Greiveldinger , the man from the
>Department of Justice with the responsibility of implementing the the
>Key Escrow plan.
>[...]
>It became clear that the system was not fully designed.

Reminds me of the trembling, pale kid at the front of the classroom
giving a book report, reading aloud from a blank page. He didn't do his
homework. Not only that, but it's the wrong assignment. No matter, he's
about to be expelled anyway.

This key escrow system is as solid as oozing phlegm. In the Official
Announcement we hear of a new Key Escrow System. Hm, what's it about?
Apparently not a Key Escrow System, from what I can figure out. Denning
scrambles out with some bizarre circumlocution soon after the
announcement that is supposedly now Null and Void, and we have this
grand new system with the Magic Eavesdropping Box. How are we to be
sure that this Box is secure? Why, it utilizes a Secure Chip inside.
What about the Chip? Why, there are Secure Atoms and Electrons,
assuredly in the Proper Places with Correct Clearance, as designated by
The Grand Holiness.

>At this point, I had just listened to an entirely logical presentation
>from a perfect gentleman. We had just run though a system that had many
>nice technological checks and balances in it. Subverting it seemed 
>very difficult. 

Gee, I missed something there somewhere. `Not fully designed' but
`difficult to subvert' because of all the `nice technological checks'.
Yes, I would bet my life on that.

>The most interesting speaker was the assistant director of the National
>Security Agency, Dr. Clint Brooks. He immediately admitted that the
>entire Clipper project was quite unusual because the Agency was not
>used to dealing with the open world. Speaking before a wide audience
>was strange for him and he admitted that producing a very low cost
>commercial competitive chip was also a new challenge for them. 

their amateurism is frightening and pathetic. The lesson is not that it
is `a new challenge' but a outrageous violation of their authority. I'm
quite nauseated that someone here would succumb  to their transparent
and shifty rhetoric.  They have no legal authority whatsoever in
proposing this. They still fail to grasp this simple fact, despite a
bludgeoning CPSR lawsuit slaps and FOIA jabs. It is a wonder they have
stopped hiding behind the legs of the President.

>He readily admitted that the Clipper system isn't intended to catch
>any crooks. 

Ah, but we have the Official Announcement from Mr. Clinton explaining
how it would be used to catch `criminals, drug dealers, and
terrorists'! How are we to reconcile this bizarre twist? This is all so
grotesque, so Orwellian, so wretched, so horribly nightmarish... we
have the Key Escrow Initiative with everything but the Key Escrow read,
to catch all the Criminals who aren't Criminals.

>When I listened, though, I began to worry about what is going to happen
>as we begin to see the eventual blurring of data and voice communications
>systems. 

what a fantastic revelation! when did you come to this epiphany?

>WHen this happens, programmable phones are going to emerge. 

what a ...

>This
>could easily be a proprietary encryption system that scrambles
>everything. 

what a ...

gosh, it would make sense for the NSA to propose Clipper for a scenario
like that! what a coincidence!

>The traditional way of controlling technology by
>controlling the capital intensive manufacturing sites will be gone. 

what a ...

`traditional way of controlling'? more like the `past method of manipulation'!

>Sure,
>the NSA and the police will go to Radio Shack and say "We want your
>cooperation" and they'll get it. But it's the little, slippery ones
>that will be trouble in the new, software world.

what a ...

It is the big, lumbering one called NSA that is already in *deep* trouble.

[ sheriffs, district attorneys, FBI agents]
>Their message was direct and they didn't hesitate to compare encryption
>with assault rifles. One even said, "I don't want to see the officers
>outgunned in a technical arena." 

sorry, they don't have a choice in the matter.

>One DA from New Jersey said that
>in his office, they process about 10,000 cases a year, but they only
>do one to two wiretaps on average. It just seems like a big hassle
>and expense for them.

oh, perhaps you are proposing it shouldn't be a `hassle' or a
`expensive'. Let me tell you, infringing on rights better DAMN WELL be
more than a `hassle'!

>The
>police tried to use the low numbers of wiretaps as evidence that they're not
>out there abusing the system, but I kept thinking that this was mainly
>caused by the high cost and relatively low utility of the technique. 

bless you. Now I only feel 95% like strangling you.

>In the end, I reduced the calculus of the decision about Clipper to be
>a simple tradeoff. If we allow widespread, secure encryption, will the
>criminals take great advantage of this system?

who is `we'? what do you mean by `allow'? this terminology presupposes
the fact that you, the NSA, or anyone else has the capability to control it.

>It would empower people to protect their own
>information unconditionally, but at the cost of letting the criminals
>do the same.

ultimately a net gain, IMHO.  There is far more to gain from protection
of businesses and private mail than any increased evasive power given
to criminals. The point is, we can catch criminals without illegitimate
crutches like wiretapping. In fact, I think wiretapping ultimately
encourages laziness and inefficiency in law enforcement and
investigative/detective work. We stand to gain a more efficient law
enforcement system when it is ultimately rendered impossible.

>I began to wonder if the choice between Clipper and totally secure
>encryption was moot.

for any true cypherpunk, it is not.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized,
and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned.
Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin@anon.penet.fi.