Clipper trapdoor?

[Tom Knight <tk@reagan.ai.mit.edu>]

You didn't read the original clipper announcement carefully.  It never
said that all access to the escrowed keys was to be handled through
warrants.  Clearly the other weasel word access techniques envisioned
included requests from the Agencies.

My paranoid fantasy, actually, is that we are really seeing phase I of a
longer term plan, which will result in outlawing non-escrowed keys.  The
way it works is this:

Skipjack is distributed.  A clever group of nameless individuals obtains
some components.  Through significant effort, they determine the
algorithm and family key, and they are published.  Phase II: mock
Agency uproar ensues, NSA claims it tried to be "reasonable" about
escrowed keys, but obviously the bad guys have demonstrated that they
can't be trusted.  The only way to solve the "problem" is to outlaw
non-escrowed key cryptography.