Re: Weak RSA keys, 2nd post

[Karl Lui Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>]

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

(sorry for posting this twice, but as I sent the previous message, line
noise or something overtook me)

It does appear that there can be multiple decryption keys, but with good
choices of p and q, there will be only two.

Whether or not "ed = 1 mod phi(n)" is a myth or not... depends.  Look at
"Cryptography: an Intoduction to Computer Security" by Seberry and
Pieprzyk.  On page 92, equation 3.9 gives the relation between encryption
and decryption keys as "ed = 1 mod gamma(n)" where gamma(n) = lcm(p-1,q-1).
Which is what the "F" function described before is.

With proper choices of p and q, the d calulcated by the first forumla and
the d calculated by the second will be the same.

Of course, since you must know how to factor n to calculate the "spare" key,
it isn't clear to me how it will help you decrypt a message.  With large
enough properly chosen primes, it won't matter.  Solution: pick good primes.

An example with better choices for p and q:

p = 107; q = 167; n = pq = 17869
phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1) = 17596
e = 43

Method 1: d = 43^-1 mod 17596 = 7775
Method 2: lcm(p-1, q-1) = 8798      
          d = 43^-1 mod 8798 = 7775 

Either method: message M = 71
               encrypted M' = 71^43 mod 17869 = 10073
               decrypt = 10073^7775 mod 17869 = 71

The "spare" key is 7775 + 8798 = 16573, which does indeed work.

But again, I don't see how an attacker can use info about the existence of
a second key.

Karl L. Barrus <klbarrus@owlnet.rice.edu>


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a

iQCVAgUBLLR5CYOA7OpLWtYzAQH/FQP/a+/uxGaKIYKuWCNcP5e0aBGMjhVPnwlU
cJxrDMSBQYcPHzMPafqXIdfIlNE/g7aB/0Fnnh2cB4MtwvsGiCOe/XGNUgrR+R+e
X2LWBlQmQ4YBPRnGgXAejX8LkWTScexIrfcXLsps6REyJHVoJB/5gpLNflBnjW5C
h8xTNoqknf4=
=8y9+
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----