Paranoid

[nobody@Menudo.UH.EDU]

>>> Does this allow a cracker to search for the compression's signature
>>> after every attempt?
 
>Every attempt?  You mean every attempt at encryption?  Well, yes and
>no.  Yes, there is a semi-known plaintext inside the encrypted data.
>It is unknown if this can help an attacker.
 
"unknown" doesn't provide anyone with very much reassurance.
 
 
>>> Would using UUENCODE on the text and deleting the "begin/end" lines
>>> before encrypting it have a synergistic effect on the difficulty of
>>> cracking a secret key from that particular message?
 
>This would give an attacker even MORE of a plaintext attack, since
>this will create lines of 64 characters, starting with an "M", which
>gives a regular pattern to the plaintext.
 
Not all versions of UUENCODE start each line with an "M" and there are
other programs similar to UUENCODE that can be used. The synergistic effect
would also be due to the fact that the cracker would be clueless to the fact
that UUENCODE was being used, but only if there is no type of checksum or
compression signature that was being used instead of a spell checker.
 
A spell checker?? This is insane. There has got to be some type of checksum
code that verifies if the text was decrypted properly or not. Crackers can't
possibly be trying keys and word searching for "the" or "and". Where have all
the code writters vanished to?
 
Doesn't the recursive use of DES have a synergistic effect?
 
 
>>> Is there an easy way to generate keys larger than 1024 bits?
 
>No.  However given current technology and assuming no significant
>breakthroughs in factoring algorithms, a 1024 bit key wont be broken
>for over a million year (significantly more, if I recall).
 
My opinion ---> What TotalFuckingBullshit(tm) <---
 
Technology is growing exponentially. Try: "for over 10 year[sic]"
 
Any decent "personal computer" can crack mediocre DES encryptions in a semi
reasonable amount of time. 10 years ago how many people do you think thought
that this would be possible?
 
Is there some type of design flaw that limits RSA keys to 1024 bits??