Crypto Experts Oppose Clipp

[Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>]

  Crypto Experts Oppose Clipper

     More than three dozen of the nation's leading cryptographers,
computer security specialists and privacy experts today urged
President Clinton to abandon the controversial Clipper encryption
proposal.  The letter was coordinated by Computer Professionals
for Social Responsibility (CPSR), which has long sought to open
the issue of cryptography policy to public debate

     The group cited the secrecy surrounding the proposal,
widespread public opposition to the plan and privacy concerns as
reasons why the initiative should not go forward.

     The letter comes at a crucial point in the debate on
cryptography policy.  An internal Administration review of the
issue is nearing completion and the National Security Agency (NSA)
is moving forward with efforts to deploy Clipper technology in
civilian agencies, including the Internal Revenue Service.

     CPSR has sponsored several public conferences on
cryptography and privacy and has litigated Freedom of Informa-
tion Act cases seeking the disclosure of relevant government
documents.  In one pending FOIA case, CPSR is challenging the
secrecy of the Skipjack algorithm which underlies the Clipper
proposal.

	For additional information, contact Dave Banisar, CPSR
Washington, DC, (202) 544-9240, <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org>.

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January 24, 1994

The President
The White House
Washington, DC  20500

Dear Mr. President,

     We are writing to you regarding the "Clipper" escrowed 
encryption proposal now under consideration by the White House.  
We wish to express our concern about this plan and similar 
technical standards that may be proposed for the nation's 
communications infrastructure.  

     The current proposal was developed in secret by federal 
agencies primarily concerned about electronic surveillance, not 
privacy protection.  Critical aspects of the plan remain 
classified and thus beyond public review.  

     The private sector and the public have expressed nearly 
unanimous opposition to Clipper.  In the formal request for 
comments conducted by the Department of Commerce last year, less 
than a handful of respondents supported the plan.  Several hundred 
opposed it.
 
     If the plan goes forward, commercial firms that hope to 
develop new products will face extensive government obstacles.  
Cryptographers who wish to develop new privacy enhancing 
technologies will be discouraged.  Citizens who anticipate that 
the progress of technology will enhance personal privacy will  
find their expectations unfulfilled.

     Some have proposed that Clipper be adopted on a voluntary 
basis and suggest that other technical approaches will remain 
viable.  The government, however, exerts enormous influence in the 
marketplace, and the likelihood that competing standards would 
survive is small.  Few in the user community believe that the 
proposal would be truly voluntary.

     The Clipper proposal should not be adopted.  We believe that 
if this proposal and the associated standards go forward, even on 
a voluntary basis, privacy protection will be diminished, 
innovation will be slowed, government accountability will be 
lessened, and the openness necessary to ensure the successful 
development of the nation's communications infrastructure will be 
threatened.

     We respectfully ask the White House to withdraw the Clipper 
proposal.

Sincerely,

Public Interest and Civil Liberties Organizations

  Marc Rotenberg, CPSR
  Conrad Martin, Fund for Constitutional Government
  William Caming, privacy consultant
  Simon Davies, Privacy International
  Evan Hendricks, US Privacy Council
  Simona Nass, Society for Electronic Access
  Robert Ellis Smith, Privacy Journal
  Jerry Berman, Electronic Frontier Foundation

Cryptographers and Security Experts

  Bob Bales, National Computer Security Association
  Jim Bidzos, RSA Data Security Inc.
  G. Robert Blakley, Texas A&M University
  Stephen Bryen, Secured Communications Technologies, Inc.
  David Chaum, Digicash
  George Davida, University of Wisconsin
  Whitfield Diffie, Sun Microsystems
  Martin Hellman, Stanford University
  Ingemar Ingemarsson, Universitetet i Linkvping
  Ralph C. Merkle, Xerox PARC
  William Hugh Murray, security consultant
  Peter G. Neumann, SRI International
  Bart Preneel, Katolieke Universiteit 
  Ronald Rivest, MIT
  Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography (1993)
  Richard Schroeppel, University of Arizona
  Stephen Walker, Trusted Information Systems
  Philip Zimmermann, Boulder Software Engineering

Industry and Academia

  Andrew Scott Beals, Telebit International
  Mikki Barry, InterCon Systems Corporation
  David Bellin, North Carolina A&T University
  Margaret Chon, Syracuse University College of Law
  Laura Fillmore, Online BookStore
  Scott Fritchie, Twin-Cities Free Net
  Gary Marx, University of Colorado
  Ronald B. Natalie, Jr, Sensor Systems Inc.
  Harold Joseph Highland, Computers & Security
  Doug Humphrey, Digital Express Group, Inc
  Carl Pomerance, University of Georgia
  Eric Roberts, Stanford University
  Jonathan Rosenoer, CyberLaw & CyberLex
  Alexis Rosen, Public Access Networks Corp.
  Steven Zorn, Pace University Law School

     (affiliations are for identification purposes only)