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Re: REMAIL: Cover traffic
Arsen Ray Arachelian writes:
> ...Even better, have each remailer send a specific
> number of messages to each of the other remailers on the
> network. These messages would be bogus messages,
> however, there would be a fixed number of them.
>
> If a real nym message arrives, it is sent to the next mailer
> up the chain, as part of the n (n-1 now) that are bogus. That
> way a spook couldn't tell where a message was going since
> he couldn't count the number of messages going out of the
> mailer.
>
> Also if a target remailer has n real messages to be sent to,
> any messages over that assigned packet size of messages
> get spooled for the next round of bogus mail. This way each
> remailer will send exactly n messages to every other
> remailer on the net every specified period of time.
>
I like this idea. It seems to use fewer CPU resources than having a
remailer route a bogus message through a random set of other remailers and
back to itself.
If I understand the encrypted remailer scheme correctly, the "route
through random set" mechanism requires a remailer to enclose a bogus
message in a set of nested digital envelopes (one for each remailer in the
random remailer set). The "round-robin send to peers" mechanism only
requires the remailer to create one envelope per bogus message.
I also like the idea because it seems easier to analyse, and therefore
easier to describe/formalize the properties of the system as a whole.
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