Anonymous Pools

[hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)]

>The "message drop" is essentially what a "pool" is,

The message drop described was held at a single place, not transmitted
widely or even available widely, as a message pool is.  

I've come to believe that message drops or, more generally, rendevouz
points are a big pragmatic win.

Here's why.  I have a friend out here whose BBS was seized in a civil
action by Sega.  Sega's lawyers made a pleading to the court based on
logs they had taken from the BBS.  The court granted Sega the ability
to search and seize the computer.

But all Sega had was the phone number.

So Sega first had a _subpoena duces tecum_ served on Pacific Bell.
This form of subpoena is not an order to appear but rather an order to
produce documents or items relevant to a judicial proceeding.  Sega
gave Pac Bell the phone number, Pac Bell gave them a name and address.
This was the same name and address that the US Marshall's service used
when seizing the BBS equipment.

Suppose that phone number was an email address or an IP address.

If the provider of message or packet delivery actually knows the final
destination, a subpoena to produce records will disclose that
destination.  On the other hand, if the 'public face' of the address
is only mapped to some authentication means (such as a password or a
public key), then such a subpoena will only reveal that authentication
info, not an identity or a location.

Willful ignorance can be a beautiful thing.

Furthermore, if the system is constructed such that the only way to
get at the information in RAM about current connections is to take
down the system, well, then there's no way to get at that information,
is there?

Eric