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Matsui-san Attack
]> A bigger problem is that PEM uses DES rather than IDEA. I just learned
]> of a new attack by Mitsuru Matsui of Mitsubishi that requires 2^43
]> *known* plaintexts, not chosen ones. The note I received says that it
]> ``breaks the scheme in 50 days on 12 HP9735 workstations''. This was
]> presented last week at the Japanese Conference on Cryptography and
]> Information Security.
50 days on 12 HP9735 = 600 days on a single HP9735
The 735 has a pretty fast Mflop rating (compared to Sun, IBM, SGI, PC, and
Macs). Using a comparable breaker on the average machine, it is going
to take two years to "break the scheme".
That leaves two years to create stronger/tighter strategies.