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Re: SASE Suggestion
:Lance Cottrell writes:
:
:> I have been meditating on this problem of return
:> addresses, and have a proposal. The remailers
:> can not be allowed to choose the return path,
:> as any corrupted remailer will corrupt the rest
:> of the path.
:
Jim Miller writes:
:As I understand it, the remailers don't "chose" the return path, Bob (the
:sender of the original message) choses the return path when he creates the
:SASE. All the remailers do is interpret the part of the SASE that becomes
:readable to them after decrypting the SASE portion sent to them from the
:previous hop. If all is working, what becomes readable is the address of
:the next hop (closer to Bob) and some misc other stuff (postage, maybe,
:and perhaps another encryption key).
:
:Am I not understanding something correctly?
:
:[email protected]
:
One SASE scheme recently suggested involved sending a request for
a SASE to a ramailer, stating the number of jumps required. It then
sent it to another remailer, and so on. Each adding a layer, and eventually
sending the results to the desired correspondent. I mentioned that if the
first remailer was corrupted, that the whole chain was (it would only send
to other corrupt remailers).
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Lance Cottrell who does not speak for CASS/UCSD
[email protected]
PGP 2.3 key available by finger or server.
"Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly
it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice
weasels come."
--Nietzsche
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