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Quantum Crypto.
[Here is the conclusion to my QC paper, unfortunately I can't get the
whole file into a PS format because of the faulty file translators in the
Mac applications.]
Conclusion
Quantum cryptography has proven to be an interesting and novel
application of quantum physics. It does posses some severe limitations
that I have considered.
Optimistic predictions of it�s affective area is still far below
100 km. This may of course change depending on technological
development. It has been suggested to me that one could have secure
stations where interception and reception of the message would be
allowed. [10] This is possible, but weakens the �absoluteness� that is
the appeal of quantum cryptography.
A basic assumption is made previous to the research mentioned:
that Eve will not interfere on the public channel. It could be very
possible that Eve would set herself up between Alice and Bob on the
quantum and private channels, and act as a relay station that I mentioned
in the first point. She would have to impersonate both Alice and Bob,
who in reality might not even be on the same public and quantum channels,
but merely think they are. Public key methods could be used for
authentication, but this destroys the motivation for the use of quantum
cryptography.
I feel the solution here is in the definition of
�public�. Meaning a random and public switching of public channels,
phone numbers and such. Even this may be subverted by a very powerful
Eve who may also control the phone company�s switching circuits. Perhaps
further thought can resolve this issue, but the problem of identification
and authentication on the public channel is severe.
Further, quantum cryptography is subject to a denial of service
attack. If Eve wishes, she may destroy the unique and expensive quantum
channel, or merely observe everything that goes by, not caring to read
the information, just making it unsuitable for use by Alice and Bob.
Ekert�s concept of keeping shared EPR pairs in permanent storage (perhaps
using a superconductor to warehouse keys when the quantum channel is
open) is not yet feasible, and it will be necessary to keep these keys
somewhere , but the security of keys is not a problem unique to quantum
cryptography.
I look forward to the resolution of these issues and the
further development of the technology that will allow quantum
cryptography to become a �practical� security mechanism.
1. C. Bennett. Science.. vol. 257, p. 752 (August, 1992).
2, C. Bennett, G. Brassard, and A. Ekert. Scientific American. p.
50 (Oct., 1992)
3. A. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. vol. 67, p. 661 (1991)
4. C. Bennet, and G. Brassard, Phys. Rev. Lett. vol. 68, p. 557 (1992)
5. A. Ekert, J. Rarity, P. Tapster, and G. Palma, Phys. Rev. Lett.
vol. 69, p. 1293, (1993).
6. A. Muller, J. Breguet, and N. Gisin. Europhs. Lett., vol. 23 (6),
p. 383 (1993).
7. S. Barnett, and S. Phoenix. Phys. Rev. A, vol 48 (1), p. R5,
(July, 1993).
8. C. Bennett. Phys. Rev. Lett. vol 68 (21), p. 3121 (1992)
9. D. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security.
10. Personal e-mail as a follow-up to a posting to sci.crypt. I have
unfortunately lost the person�s name.