Re: New server up.

[pgpkeys@wasabi.io.com (PGP Slave Key Server)]

	PGP Slave,

I hear and obey O Master.

	Could you please announce my full name, phone number, address, visa card
	number, a giff of my signature, height, weight and driver's licence number
	not only to the Cypherpunks mailing list but to many usenet groups as well,

If you insist :-)  (Can you give me a few more days to comply?...I`m having
some trouble getting a copy of your signature.  One of the guys in the chem
faculty says he knows where he can get one at the weekend...)

	since you obviously feel I no longer wish to be known to the masses as
	Xenon, and I instead want them to start calling me and postal mailing me
	asking for copies of PGP. Thanks asshole. I thought the people on this
	list were concerned with privacy, but I was wrong. I mention Xenon in
	my personal .plan, but I ask people to let me keep the small amount of
	extra privacy I still retain.

Hey bud, you`ve clearly misunderstood the whole point of the movement.  You
get whatever privacy you can make for yourself through technology.  Any dolt
who goes to the extent of using two remailers and a penet id to hide his
identity then puts his nym`s secret key in his True Name signature file
gets the privacy he deserves.  Anyway, whats the big deal?...noone who
read my post will have a clue who you are unless you tell them yourself; and
anyone who could track you down from the two bits of info in that post is
more than capable of tracking you down the same way I did from the public
logs on netcom.  I was just waving enough of a red rag at you to make the
point forcefully...  (remember your the one arguing against putting delays
more than 15 minutes in a remailer system...)

The point I was making was that you cannot rely on trust such as a lack of
logs alone to keep things like remailer chains secure...you *have* to build
the security into the technology and the protocols.  You must assume that
The Bad Guys (tm) have full access to all the logs of all the machines that
run remailers...if not directly then by watching the wires.  So any remailer
scheme has to include dummy traffic, significant delays, and encrypted input
way back at the sender`s end.  And the protocol has to be such that a remailer
chain is as strong as its strongest link, not as weak as its weakest link,
meaning if 9 out of 10 remailers have been compromised but the 10`th is run by
Honest Joe, then Honest Joe`s trustworthiness is sufficient to defeat the evil
forces of TBG with there 9 bogus servers.

	You wrote,
	"qwerty account or not, the public logs on netcom show more than enough
	info to trivially track people down."

	Trivial? And so you hack out the info that a message went from remailer
	A through qwerty and on to remailer B, at a certain time. You haven't
	tracked down anyone my friend.

Yo dude, I found *you* didn`t I?  And it took me less than 5 minutes.  So
bite me.

PS How to build your own mailer logs on netcom...just stay on long enough
and keep typing `mailq`...no problemo...I can`t be bothered but if I could
thats how I`d track traffic through qwerty for your $20...