Re: doj_escrow_intercept.procedures (fwd)

[rcain@netcom.com (Robert Cain)]

Wow! That procedure, if it could be verified to be followed, is almost
good enough to satisfy my queasy feeling that some *very dificult* and
*very publicly* accessable means of opening a back door might just not
be appropriate.  Even though this goes strongly against my personal
interest I can envision situations where I would want them to have that
ability.  Imagine that it is your city that gets a terrorist nuke built
in one of its basements.  Truly secure and easy communication makes
that a whole lot easier but then since a truly secure box is real
simple to make, it sort of obviates the reasoning for trying to do the
standardization anyway.  Anybody who really wants absolute security
will be able to get it at some price that won't be too high.  :-)

I would like to propose us the challenge to come up with a way
utilizing this crypto technology and signatures and such to guarantee a
verifiable trail whenever it is done that is available to any court
of law.  The implication is clear that other forms will be outlawed
if this package is sold.  No point in even doing it otherwise.  So
in case they win this one I suggest that, as Tom Lehrer talks about
on his album Revisited, we "Be Prepared."  :-)


Peace,

Bob

-- 
Bob Cain    rcain@netcom.com   408-354-8021


           "I used to be different.  But now I'm the same."


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