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Re: Dorothy Denning at it again
> Question: How does one access RISKS 15.48
Hmm...I've gotten a few of these questions already. It's been such a long
time that I've considered the Risks digest to be required reading that it
didn't occur to me to be more explicit.
Anyway, you want to read the newsgroup comp.risks; you can find the
particular digest by looking at the subject lines.
And, what the heck...for those of you who can't or don't want to to into
comp.risks, here is the article. Enjoy.
Date: Wed, 09 Feb 1994 17:23:28 -0500 (EST)
From: [email protected] (Dorothy Denning)
Subject: Re: Campaign and Petition Against Clipper
CPSR has announced a petition campaign to oppose the Clipper initiative. I
would like to caution people about signing the petition. The issues are
extremely complex and difficult. The Clipper initiative is the result of
considerable deliberation by many intelligent people who appreciate and
understand the concerns that have been expressed and who worked hard to
accommodate the conflicting interests. The decisions that have been made were
not made lightly.
I would like to respond to some of the statements that CPSR has made
about Clipper in their campaign and petition letters:
The Clipper proposal, developed in secret by the National Security
Agency, is a technical standard that will make it easier for
government agents to wiretap the emerging data highway.
The standard (FIPS 185) is not a standard for the Internet or any other high
speed computer network. It is for the telephone system. Quoting from FIPS
185: "Data for purposes of this standard includes voice, facsimile and
computer information communicated in a telephone system. A telephone system
for purposes of this standard is limited to a system which is circuit switched
and operating at data rates of standard commercial modems over analog voice
circuits or which uses basic-rate ISDN or a similar grade wireless service."
The standard will not make it any easier to tap phones, let alone
computer networks. All it will do is make it technically possible to
decrypt communications that are encrypted with the standard, assuming
the communications are not superencrypted with something else. Law
enforcers still need to get a court order just to intercept the
communications in the first place, and advances in technology have made
interception itself more difficult. The standard will make it much
harder for anyone to conduct illegal taps, including the government.
The purpose of the standard is to provide a very strong encryption algorithm -
something much stronger than DES - and to do so in a way that does not thwart
law enforcement and national security objectives. Keys are escrowed so that
if someone uses this technology, they cannot use it against national
interests.
Industry groups, professional associations and civil liberties
organizations have expressed almost unanimous opposition to the
plan since it was first proposed in April 1993.
"The public does not like Clipper and will not accept it ..."
The private sector and the public have expressed nearly unanimous
opposition to Clipper.
As near as I know, neither CPSR nor any other group has conducted any
systematic poll of industry, professional societies, or the public. While
many people have voiced opposition, there are many more organizations and
people who have been silent on this issue. The ACM is in the process of
conducting a study on encryption. CPSR is a member of the study group, as am
I. Steve Kent is chair. Our goal is a report that will articulate the
issues, not a public statement either for or against. The International
Association for Cryptologic Research has not to my knowledge made any official
statement about Clipper.
The Administration ignored the overwhelming opposition of the
general public. When the Commerce Department solicited public
comments on the proposal last fall, hundreds of people opposed the
plan while only a few expressed support.
Hundreds of people is hardly overwhelming in a population of 250 million,
especially when most of the letters were the same and came in through the net
following a sample letter that was sent out.
The technical standard is subject to misuse and compromise. It
would provide government agents with copies of the keys that
protect electronic communications. "It is a nightmare for computer
security."
I have been one of the reviewers of the standard. We have completed our
review of the encryption algorithm, SKIPJACK, and concluded it was very
strong. While we have not completed our review of the key escrow system, from
what I have seen so far, I anticipate that it will provide an extremely high
level of security for the escrowed keys.
The underlying technology was developed in secret by the NSA, an
intelligence agency responsible for electronic eavesdropping, not
privacy protection. Congressional investigations in the 1970s
disclosed widespread NSA abuses, including the illegal
interception of millions of cables sent by American citizens.
NSA is also responsible for the development of cryptographic codes to protect
the nation's most sensitive classified information. They have an excellent
track record in conducting this mission. I do not believe that our
requirements for protecting private information are greater than those for
protecting classified information. I do not know the facts of the 1970s
incident that is referred to here, but it sounds like it occurred before
passage of the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. This act requires
intelligence agencies to get a court order in order to intercept
communications of American citizens. I am not aware of any recent evidence
that the NSA is engaging in illegal intercepts of Americans.
Computer security experts question the integrity of the
technology. Clipper was developed in secret and its
specifications are classified.
The 5 of us who reviewed the algorithm unanimously agreed that it was very
strong. We will publish a final report when we complete or full evaluation.
Nothing can be concluded from a statement questioning the technology by
someone who has not seen it regardless of whether that person is an expert in
security.
NSA overstepped its legal authority in developing the standard. A
1987 law explicitly limits the intelligence agency's power to set
standards for the nation's communications network.
The 1987 Computer Security Act states that NIST "shall draw on the technical
advice and assistance (including work products) of the National Security
Agency."
There is no evidence to support law enforcement's claims that new
technologies are hampering criminal investigations. CPSR recently
forced the release of FBI documents that show no such problems.
CPSR obtained some documents from a few FBI field offices. Those offices
reported no problems. CPSR did not get reports from all field offices and did
not get reports from local law enforcement agencies. I can tell you that it
is a fact that new communications technologies, including encryption, have
hampered criminal investigations. I personally commend law enforcement for
trying to get out in front of this problem.
If the plan goes forward, commercial firms that hope to develop
new products will face extensive government obstacles.
Cryptographers who wish to develop new privacy enhancing
technologies will be discouraged.
The standard is voluntary -- even for the government.
Mr. Rotenberg said "We want the public to understand the full
implications of this plan. Today it is only a few experts and
industry groups that understand the proposal.
I support this objective. Unfortunately, it is not possible for most of us to
be fully informed of the national security implications of uncontrolled
encryption. For very legitimate reasons, these cannot be fully discussed and
debated in a public forum. It is even difficult to talk about the full
implications of encryption on law enforcement. This is why it is important
that the President and Vice-President be fully informed on all the issues, and
for the decisions to be made at that level. The Feb. 4 decision was made
following an inter-agency policy review, headed by the National Security
Council, that examined these issues using considerable input from industry,
CPSR, EFF, and individuals as well as from law enforcement and intelligence
agencies. In the absence of understanding the national security issues, I
believe we need to exercise some caution in believing that we can understand
the full implications of encryption on society.
As part of the Feb. 4 announcement, the Administration announced the
establishment of an Interagency Working Group on Encryption and
Telecommunications, chaired by the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy and National Security Council, with representatives from
Commerce, Justice, State, Treasury, FBI, NSA, OMB, and the National Economic
Council. The group is to work with industry and public interest groups to
develop new encryption technologies and to review and refine encryption
policy. The NRC's Computer Science and Telecommunications Board will also be
conducting a study of encryption policy.
These comments may be distributed.
Dorothy Denning, Georgetown University