Re: Detweiler abuse again

["Jon 'Iain' Boone" <boone@psc.edu>]

"W. Kinney" <kinney@bogart.Colorado.EDU>  writes:
>
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> One can only reach the conclusion that Usenet is broken if one assumes
> that the remailers _aren't_. The automatic broadcast property if Usenet
> is not a problem if you can always determine the source of a message. This
> isn't an argument against anonymity, but just saying it's a little
> backwards to say that Usenet has to be redesigned because it doesn't work
> with the remailers.

  The real problem is the same sort of problem that one has to face in all
  public spaces.  If an individual is allowed to speak, they may be abusive.
  If they are not allowed to speak, the state is being abusive.  Usenet is
  a public space.  Sure, people have attempted to moderate parts of it, but
  all they've really done is split off from the public space to form private
  spaces which have restrictive policies on content.  

> Why not use technology to solve a technological problem? The difficulty 
> here is that it is impossible for any one remailer operator to prevent 
> someone, say LD, from using the remailer system. The best he can do is stop 
> LD from using his site as an entry point. So why not introduce a little 
> cooperation among operators? This can be accomplished without collusion of 
> the sort that would break anonymity.

  Co-operation amongst remailer operators won't solve this problem either.
  If any one site lets Larry use a remailer, then he's free to abuse the
  system.  Like open terminal servers, a few may survive the purge, but
  the abuses tend to consolidate the opinion of the many against the
  idea of the service.

> Pretty much all the remailer operators are 'punks, right? If a critical 
> mass of operators get together and agree to block a standardized set of 
> sources and destinations, then that group of operators will have enough 
> pull to force the other operators to toe the line. The trick is to block 
> messages from remailer _operators_ who refuse to agree to behave as part of 
> the community, effectively isolating the wildcats. An isolated remailer is 
> useless.

  First of all, I'd like to see remailer servers running on a well-known
  port.  That way, anyone could stick up a remailer, provided they had
  access to a C compiler.  There would be no cabal of remailer operators, 
  because everyone would have the possiblity of being a remailer.  Also,
  an isolated remailer isn't useless.  It doesn't provide perfect anonymity,
  especially since it may be doing logging.  But, remember, when the entire
  chain is as strong as it's strongest link, the chain doesn't necessarily
  need to be more than one link long.

> Should be easy enough to work out -- a posted alert PGP signed by any two 
> remailer operators is immediately implemented, no questions asked. Remailer 
> scripts should include blocking by source, destination, or _content_, as in 
> posts on a certain subject to a certain newsgroup. This would allow 
> blocking of a nutcase using encrypted hops to post to Usenet without having 
> to collude and blow his anonymity. Just say "Sorry, due to abuse of the 
> remailers, we're not going to forward messages about the creatures from 
> Uranus using microwave mind-control any more". This is a complicated idea 
> in a general case, but scanning for subject lines, for instance, could be 
> implemented as easily as scanning for destinations.

  So then you end up with a situation where the potential abusers are writing
  subject lines which don't match the contents.  In general, you're going to
  have a hard time trying to prevent certain subjects from getting out,
  especially if you plan on automating this function.

> What we have now is a bunch of single remailers. It's a very small step to 
> create a cooperative group of remailers, and it would provide avenues for 
> solutions to a lot of the potential problems. This is not perfect, but it's 
> better.

  Actually, I don't believe that it's better.  I think that the base
  functionality of remailers should be standardized, so that they can 
  all interoperate, but I don't think that forcing the operators into
  a cabal is at all helpfull.

> tytso@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Theodore Ts'o):
> 
> > Lance is, unfortunately, pointing out some huge, gaping holes in the
> > current architecture of the Cypherpunks remailers.  It would be good if
> 
> LD is smart enough to know that you _chain_ remailers for anonymity. I 
> think he wanted us to know it was him, and wanted to see whether or not Hal 
> would blow his anonymity when it came down to it.

  I think you're right.  He wanted to know if Hal could be trusted to not
  give in when the "abuse" became unbearable.  Hal, apparently, couldn't.

  I understand that Hal has to do what he feels is right.  However, if all
  remailer operators are going to cave when faced with an "abuser" who they
  don't agree with, then there will be no anonymity for anyone.

  What ever happened to "I hate what you say, but I will fight to the death
  for your right to say it?"

  How long will it be before we get to the point where certain "contents" are
  considered off-limits?  

  Everyone needs to be able to run a remailer.  How else will you be able to
  trust the remailer operator?

 Jon Boone | PSC Networking | boone@psc.edu | (412) 268-6959 | PGP Key # B75699
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