Re: STEALTH OCEANS

[Sergey Goldgaber <sergey@delbruck.pharm.sunysb.edu>]

On Wed, 23 Feb 1994, Matt Thomlinson wrote:

> I'd say having a TSR "hideit.com" loaded into high memory (installed size:
> xxxx bytes) watching INT (whatever) would be a pretty good clues that
> someone trying to determine that you were using a program to protect areas
> of your disk would look for. Perhaps you could try and hide this, too; in 
> any case, you address TSRs later...
> 

Again, no TSRs are necessary.  Having a simple, common utility on hand is 
all that is needed.

> > > > Simple.  You would take note of the starting address of the file.  And, 
> > > > the length of the file.
> > > 
> > > how do you control individual writes? 
> > 
> > With a standard direct disk read/write utility.
> 
> uh, I don't have one. Do you?
> 

Sure!  Norton's Disk Editor!  I think that it may be limited to doing
everything manually, one sector at a time, though.  I'm not a big MSDOS user,
so I can't direct you to a more convenient utility, but I'm sure they're 
out there.

> I'm NOT talking about how to recover areas of your disk (you could use 
> something like Norton Utilities to pull the noise file off the disk). 
> What I'm trying to understand is how you plan to keep that area of your 
> disk off limits. 
> 

You don't keep anything off limits.  If an intruder uses the standard OS 
(instead of the proper utility) to write to your disk, he might erase 
your data.  That is not a problem!  He's doing you a favor by destroying 
the evidence.

You, on the other hand, know better.  Thus, you will always use the 
utility to write to the free sectors of the disk.  You will have no 
problem, assuming you keep track of where your data is.

> Like it or not, programs and OSs (if you can call Windows an OS) write to 
> disk. Lots. Everywhere. How do you keep it from fragmenting the disk 
> immediately and overwriting the space (whose address you have written 
> down on that sheet of paper next to your computer?)
> 

You use a floppy disk that is only accessed by your utility, which 
bypasses DOS (and Windows, which is DOS based).  You keep your disk 
write-protected at all other times.

> Try running windows with a temp swapfile. Run photoshop for windows (it 
> writes its' own tempfile on the drive). Save a file from Word for Windows 
> and try and control where it goes.
> 

That's correct.  But this is only the case when you are letting DOS write 
to disk for you.  If you use _direct_ (ie. _not_ DOS) disk writes, you can
specify which sectors you write to!

> 
> I'm not saying these problems can't be solved; I _am_ saying that what 
> has been proposed thus far doesn't adequately address this (if you're 
> looking at this as a genuine way to hide your data).
> 

I disagree.  I do admit that the more security you want, the more complicated
the issue gets.  At the simplest level, all you have to do is delete your
"noise" file.  This is a solution to hiding "noise" files that is 
available to everyone.  Problems crop up only when your opponent is 
determined, knowledgable, and capable.  Although more effort will be 
required, I believe that the system I've outlined will prevent even the 
most determined opponent from finding evidence even of the existence of your
"noise" files.

> 
> > > vs. where your data is kept. Authorize each write by hand? (PROGMAN.EXE 
> > > is attempting to write to cylinder 12, track 14. Authorize (y/N)? ) 
> > 
> > Disable authorization.  Most DOSs allow direct writes without 
> > authorization anyway.
> 
> No, no. We _need_ to protect the noise area. 
> 

All the protection that is neccessary is that of your keeping track of
the location of your files.  Just don't write back to those sectors 
again, unless you want to overwrite your data.

> how? change the FAT? TSR? My example above was an attempt to try and
> understand what a TSR you might build would have to ask, every single time
> a regular write to disk was performed. (to protect your deleted noise
> file).
> 

Once again, NO TSR IS NECESSARY!  In fact, it is detrimental, for the reasons
that I have outlined in my previous messages.

> 
> > You need _not_ have a TSR with the location.  If you keep track of the 
> > address/length yourself, the problem is eliminated.  The whole
> 
> except for the fact that your computer will overwrite your data (which, 
> in fact, is *deleted* space, waiting to be written over) in the meantime.
> 

Only if you use standard DOS disk writes.  Bypass DOS and your problem is 
solved.


> > be a more elegant solution.  Otherwise, store your "noise" files 
> > sequentially, on a floppy that you use only for storing encrypted data.  
> 
> Ah, a floppy? this makes 10 times more sense. With a floppy you wouldn't 
> have haphazard writes to disk (as you do with your harddrive). 
> 

Exactly.
 
> sure. two choices:
> 
> 1) We must protect our noise data.
> 	Keep it in a location on disk, keep a TSR in memory to protect
> that area from writes. 
> 
> 2) We don't protect our noise data. 
> 	Keep our data in a location on disk, keep the spots on paper, and 
> hope that by the time we need to retreive it, the data hasn't been 
> written over. 
> 
> I sure wouldn't want to count on 2), and it seems as if 1) defeats the 
> purpose.
> 

Are you forgetting the floppy+direct-disk-writes solution?  Choice 2 makes
sense!
 
> >  1 split the "noise" file into smaller parts which would be interspersed 
> >    randomly among the other deleted grabage.  This would make for a less 
> >    conspicuous disk; as, there are, normally, truely random sections of 
> >    the disk along with the not-so-random sections.  Your bits of noise-file
> >    will fit right in!
> 
> not bad. One thing to consider: we've moved all of our data to the end of 
> the disk, anyway; we'd still have most of our important data at the end 
> of the disk, which still might look conspicuous statistically.
>

Moving all the data to the end of the disk was not a suggestion made by me.
I agree that it would be rather silly.
 
> >  2 use a steganorgraphy utility to embed the "noise" file in a section
> >    of the other not-so-random garbage (as some people currently use those
> >    same utilities to embed their PGP files in GIFs), and then delete it.
> >    (Owning a stegonagraphy utility would, of course, be as conspicuous
> >     as owning PGP.  So the same precautions would have to be applied.)
> 
> not bad. Takes (8 times?) more space, but should work.
> 

Two choices:
 
 Space sacrificed for security.  

 Or, security sacrificed for space.

> 
> Do you understand my objection to keeping track of the files' location by 
> hand? It isn't that keeping track of the location/length of the file is 
> hard, or retreiving it is tough; the problem is keeping the OS, etc from 
> overwriting it in the meantime. 
> 

I understand.  However, your objection doesn't make sense in light of the 
above conclusions.


Thanks for your prompt replies, though!  Keep 'em coming!

Sergey