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DH Exchange Code / Magic Money comments
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DH Exchange announcement follows these comments on mpd's message.
Pr0duct Cypher
[email protected] wrote:
>Earlier this morning I grabbed the latest version of Magic Money
>from csn.org and compiled it under the Borland C++ 3.1 IDE. Since
>the Borland C compiler is one of the more paranoid ones around, I
>thought I would briefly list the things I had to do in order to
>get zero warnings and zero errors.
>The sources I started with were MGMNY10E.ZIP and PGPTL10C.ZIP.
>After #defining MSDOS you will find that it is a good idea to
>#include <stdlib.h> in almost every module. This prototypes
>quite a few of the commonly used functions which would otherwise
>cause the compiler to complain. A few modules will require
><mem.h>, <string.h>, and <time.h> since they call functions in
>these modules which are not in <stdio.h> or <stdlib.h>.
Have they changed the .h files? My compiler isn't missing any functions
when I compile it.
>The C library function "randomize" is defined in <stdlib.h>. This
>conflicts with the Magic Money function of the same name which
>initializes the MD5 based RNG used to generate coin ids. I
>changed the name of the Magic Money one to "random_init".
Blaaah. I didn't have stdlib compiled into that module, so I didn't
notice this one.
>There is no prototype for pgp_randombyte. Since this function
>returns "byte", not "int", this could be painful on any compiler
>which treats these types of function returns differently.
There is a prototype for it in pgptools.h
>Complete prototypes for (*output) and (*lookup) need to be
>provided in the function header of pgp_check_sigs and also for a
>different function pointer (*output) used in PGPKGEN.
Is this bad? I thought a function pointer didn't really care, as long
as you called it correctly.
>The Borland compiler always warns on "if (a=b)" because it
>assumes the user mistyped "if (a==b)". To get rid of the
>warning, you have to say "if (0!=(a=b)) which is optomized out by
>the compiler. This occurs in a number of places, including the
>macro for multiplication mod 65537 in idea.c.
I know, mine complains about that too, but it's a common programming
technique and there is nothing wrong with it. I've been ignoring that
particular warning.
>There is a reference to an undefined pgp_pubkey in fifo.c which
>goes away if you #include "pgptools.h". You then also have to
>toss in "mpilib.h" and "md5.h" to make "pgptools.h" happy.
Yes, when fifo.c includes pgpmem.h, it notices that in one of the
prototypes in that function. But the only function fifo calls within
pgpmem is safemalloc, so it doesn't matter. I didn't want every file
to include every other file, although it has been hard to avoid.
>It appears that mpilib.c has been persuaded to compile the UPTON
>modmult instead of the SMITH modmult. Unfortunately, there are a
>few modules which fail to #include the definition of UPTON and
>still call stage_smith_modulus and smith_modmult. Sticking in a
>#define to UPTON at the top of "mpilib.h" fixes this.
MPILIB has not been altered. It is the same as in PGP. PLATFORM appears
to set the appropriate modmult, but I usually define UPTON because SMITH
has given me some problems in the past.
>The conditional code which allows prior definition of external
>versions of mp_setp, mp_addc, mp_subb, mp_smul, and mp_rotl
>written in assembly language for some strange reason causes the
>compiler to generate externals to _P_SETP, _P_ADDC, _P_SUBB,
>_P_SMUL, and _P_ROTL instead of _mp_setp, _mp_addc, _mp_subb,
>_mp_smul, and _mp_rotl in modules which reference these routines.
>It does not seem to have this effect in mpilib.c where these
>routines are defined. Deleting the corresponding #ifdefs cures
>this.
This I hadn't noticed. You have to define NO_ASM or compile in 8086.asm.
Also define MSDOS and SMALL_MEM and DYN_ALLOC for an MSDOS machine. Take
a look at the PGP 2.3a project file.
>The compiler correctly points out that pgp_extract_rsa never uses
>the variable "pk" passed to it. At the cost of a few machine
>cycles, you can silence the compiler by putting "pk=pk" as the
>first executable statement in this function.
True. I noticed this after writing the prototype. The public key might
be useful in the future if the modexp is changed, so I left it in.
>The function pgp_randombyte hashes a variable "time" without
>first initializing its value. It might be nice to change "time"
>to "timestamp" and do a "time(×tamp) unless it was the
>authors intention to utilize uninitialized memory.
I screwed up here. I meant to include the time in the hash and forgot
to put in the call to time. I just sent an update to csn.org to fix this
one, because it could reduce the entropy of the randomizer. Time was
already factored into the initialize, so it wasn't a killer, but it
badly needed fixing. Thanks for finding it.
>If the server is executed more than one time within a second, it
>can generate indentical random values. This could be a problem when
>batch-processing mail. Including a fast timer register in the MD5
>hash in addition to the time of day in seconds would likely
>eliminate this risk.
What are you running, a Cray? My machine takes quite a few seconds to run the
server. How do you include this fast timer register? Not all machines have
it, so doing so would be very machine dependent. You could put in ifdefs
for the PC. I think PGP has this.
>The program uses "safemalloc" and "mm_safeopen" to access memory
>and files, but does a very large number of "fread" and "fwrite"
>calls without checking to see if they completed successfully. A
>"safefread" and "safefwrite" might be a good idea so the server
>does not continue happily on as the hash file fills up the disk.
Yeah, I know, and so does fifo.c in PGP Tools. I hate error checking.
If I put in safe read and write calls, what do I do if they fail? You
could do this easily with some defines, if you have the error recovery
code in mind.
Thanks for pointing out that bug, and especially for setting up a Magic
Money server.
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------
Diffie-Hellman Exchange addition to PGP Tools
Should appear on csn.org as dhex10a.zip
There has been quite a bit of interest in online crypto applications, such
as secure phones, BBSes, and TELNET connections. For these applications,
Diffie-Hellman exchange has a major advantage over RSA: there is no private
key to steal.
If RSA is used for key exchange, an attacker could record the encrypted
sessions, and then acquire your private key after the fact and decrypt
them. With Diffie-Hellman, the secret information is gone as soon as the
session is over. Using DH is equivalent to using a disposable one-time RSA
key for each session, but much faster.
This is a DH add-on for PGP Tools. There is a new PGPKGEN which exports the
prime-finding functions, the main files DHEX.C and DHEX.H, and a demo.
To use DH, we need a modulus n and a generator g. Unlike an RSA modulus,
which is a product of two primes, a DH modulus must be prime. (n-1)/2 must
also be prime. This makes the moduli slightly painful to find, but they can
be reused indefinitely. DHEX tests a modulus by first testing both n and
(n-1)/2 with fastsieve. Only if both pass is slowtest used. It still took
me a whole day to find the 1024-bit modulus in the demo. There is also a
512-bit modulus there.
To find the generator, we need the factors of n-1. They are 2 and (n-1)/2.
For each factor f, we compute ((g^((n-1)/f)) mod n). If this is 1 for
either factor, the number is NOT a generator. Generators are easy to find,
usually in one to three tries.
The modulus and generator can be saved and reused. Now Alice and Bob each
call precomp. This generates a private piece x and computes X=g^x mod n.
Big-X is the public piece. Alice and Bob exchange public pieces, then each
compute k=Y^x mod n where Y is the other person's public piece and x is
your own private piece. K will be the shared secret. We take the MD5 of
this number to get an IDEA key, which will be the same on both sides. No
eavesdropper can get this number. The public and private pieces are
disposed of - they are only used once.
This is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack, where an attacker carries
out a separate DH exchange with each party and then sits in the middle,
decrypting with one session key and encrypting with the other. A digital
signature will prevent this, if Alice and Bob have each others' public
keys. One approach is for both parties to sign their public pieces before
exchanging them. Another is to do the DH, go secure, and then each party
signs the session key and sends the signature to the other. If there is a
man in the middle, the session keys will be different. I prefer the second
method because a passive eavesdropper does not find out who is
communicating with whom. You can do this with the pgp signature functions
in PGP Tools.
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