Anyone looked at this report?

["Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat" <wex@media.mit.edu>]

[Again cribbed from RISKS...  --AW}

From: "Lance J. Hoffman" <hoffman@seas.gwu.edu>
Subject: crypto policy report available online

The following report is available by anonymous ftp from ftp.gwu.edu under
directory /pub/hoffman.  The document is stored under the name "cryptpol".
It is a NIST-sponsored study.

The table of contents and abstract follows here.

                   CRYPTOGRAPHY: POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY TRENDS
       Lance J. Hoffman, Faraz A. Ali, Steven L. Heckler, Ann Huybrechts
                                December 1, 1993

                                    CONTENTS
          EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
          1.  INTRODUCTION
          2.  TECHNOLOGY
          3.  MARKET ANALYSIS
          4.  EXPORT CONTROLS
          5.  PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES
               5.1  EXECUTIVE BRANCH
               5.2  CONGRESS
               5.3  TRENDS
          6.  POTENTIAL SCENARIOS

                                EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

During the past five years, encryption technology has become easily available
to both individuals and businesses, affording them a level of security
formerly available practically to only military, national security, and law
enforcement agencies. As a result, a debate within the United States about
the proper balance between national security and personal freedom has been
initiated. Law enforcement and national security agencies would like to
maintain tight control over civilian encryption technologies, while industry
and individual and privacy rights advocates fight to expand their ability to
distribute and use cryptographic products as they please.

This report analyzes trends in encryption technology, markets, export
controls, and legislation.  It identifies five trends which will have a
strong influence on cryptography policy in the United States:

     * The continued expansion of the Internet and the progressive
     miniaturization of cryptographic hardware combined with the  increasing
     availability and use of strong cryptographic software means that the
     strongest encryption technologies will  continue to become more easily
     obtainable everywhere in the years ahead.

     * Additional growth in networked and wireless communication will fuel a
     strong demand for encryption hardware and software both domestically and
     abroad, causing the U. S. high-technology industry to be increasingly
     interested in selling encryption products overseas and in modifying
     current export restrictions.

     * Due to the responsibilities and bureaucratic dispositions of key
     Executive Branch agencies, products using strong encryption algorithms
     such as DES will continue to face at least some export  restrictions,
     despite the widespread availability of strong encryption products
     overseas.

     * The American public is likely to become increasingly concerned about
     its privacy and about cryptographic policy as a result of the increased
     amount of personal information available online and the growing number
     of wireless and networked communications.  The development and
     increasingly widespread use of the National Information Infrastructure
     will heighten these concerns.

     * Encryption policy is becoming an important public policy issue that
     will engage the attention of all branches of government.  Congress will
     become increasingly visible in this debate due to its power of agency
     oversight and its role in passing laws accommodating the United States'
     rapid rate of technological change.  Agencies will remain very important
     since they have the implementing and, often, the planning
     responsibilities.  Since individuals and industry have more direct
     influence over Congress than over most other branches of government,
     Congress may place somewhat more emphasis on personal freedom than many
     other government actors.

Four potential scenarios are likely: mandatory escrowed encryption, voluntary
escrowed encryption, complete decontrol of encryption, or domestic decontrol
with strict export regulations.

Professor Lance J. Hoffman, Dept of EECS, The George Washington University  
(202) 994-4955  Washington, D.C. 20052  hoffman@seas.gwu.edu Fax (202) 994-0227

------------------------------