Increasing the encrypted/unencrypted ratio (was Re: Insecurity of public key crypto #1 (reply to Mandl))

[Nathan Loofbourrow <loofbour@cis.ohio-state.edu>]

"Perry E. Metzger" writes:
 > Eric Johnson says:
[in reply to bits about encrypting The List]
 > > Besides, procmail (or similar) should be able to handle piping
 > > incoming cypherpunks traffic through the decryptor, so the hoop 
 > > would be transparent anyway.  No muss, no fuss.
 > 
 > So, will procmail run for someone getting this mailing list via CCMail
 > under DOS? There are people doing that, you know.

Ah - so provide an unencrypted list for the software-challenged and
the merely lazy.

The incentive for using the encrypted list, then? Simple --
	1. Increasing ones personal encrypted-to-unencrypted ratio
and
	2. The old chestnut -- delay the unencrypted list 24 hours.

Do I need to insert the stereotype that those who can't run procmail
are probably experiencing worse delays than the above thanks to their
UUCP feed? Or is enough to use the "information*timeliness=value"
argument that's been advanced in the past to advocate encrypting
traffic *to* the list? Either way, the rhetorical advantage still lies
in the turnaround time to the list.

 > Its one thing to write tools so people can encrypt their routine
 > PRIVATE mail. Its another thing to encrypt mailing lists read by
 > hundreds of people. The former can be adjusted on a case by case basis
 > -- the latter cannot.

I believe it's traditional to reply "Indeed."

nathan