Re: clipper + enaction = illegal alternate encryption

[deeb@meceng.coe.neu.edu (Stephen Humble)]

rcain@netcom.com (Robert Cain) sez:
> There really is a strong argument from their side that says if one
> must use a form that is immune from a compromise like well escrowed
> keys one is *way* more than likely to be discussing something most
> of us would want LE or NS to know about.  I know that argument is
> anathema here but I am finding it more and more compelling.

I think "anathema" may be the wrong word - I would suggest
"incorrect".  As the number of people who habitually use strong crypto
grows, the nefarious conversations will be lost in the noise about
last night's party and recipes for chocolate truffle cake.  The
likelihood that any particular conversation is of interest to LE/NS
types must drop as well.  This will be true unless the number of
strongly-encrypted nefarious conversations grows at least as fast as
the total number of strongly-encrypted conversations.  Somehow I fail
to believe that the supply of crooks is so large.