Re: more steganography talk

[jim@bilbo.suite.com (Jim Miller)]

Eric Hughes writes:

> Assume one hundred each for 10 billion persons.  That's
> 2^40 keys, or an effective key length of 40 bits.  Since
> there are not more than 2^16 public keys right now (a
> generous estimate) we can assume that this technique is
> insecure for public keys. 

> 


I'm not really sure what you mean by "insecure for public keys".  I'm  
not trying to achieve "security through obscurity".  I'm trying to  
achieve "deniability through obscurity".

If the reverse steg process makes it look like all, or even many,  
files contain hidden messages, even when they don't, then you can  
plausible deny knowledge of a suspicious bit pattern in any specific  
file.


Jim_Miller@suite.com