some technical steganography

[hughes@ah.com (Eric Hughes)]

>I assert that an "unrecognizable encrypted message" will be a random  
>sequence of bits.  Is my assertion correct?  

It's neither correct or incorrect because the specific notion of
randomness hasn't been specified.

Your statement is falsifiable, however, since sometimes a non-random
string of bits is what you want to get out, if what you would expect
to get out normally was also non-random.  And you want them to be
non-random in the same way.

>Should I be using the  
>phrase "high entropy" instead of "random"?

No.  This was the notion of random I pointed out that didn't work.  If
you add 16 zeros to the front of a gigabit random message, that's
pretty recogizable, even though the entropy is may be very close to
maximum.

>Of course, this assumes there is no other way to detect a hidden  
>message besides reversing the stego process and testing the result.

Don't count on it.  Statistical tests can find correlations you hadn't
suspected were there.  In fact, for some message types, _not_ finding
the correlations may indicate dithering, or maybe a steganographic
message.

>property 3) the reverse stego process should product frequent "false  
>hits".  In other words, the reverse stego process should frequently  
>produce high entropy bit sequences, even if there is no hidden  
>message.

If the prior probabilities of the message type that you're hiding in
are not random, the steganographic extraction shouldn't be either,
because then there's a distinction between an unaltered container and
an incoded one.

Eric