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Graham Toal cypherpunk regular said:
The trouble with the cypherpunk remailers is there isn't a single
one of them I'd trust. The overwhelming credo of the sort of person
I've met in this area is that they want extreme absolute privacy
for *themselves* but sneak and spy on everything they possibly
can about everyone else. (Oops - that sounds bad - I don't specifically
mean the people who run cypherpunk remailers; I mean people who're
obsessive about secrecy in general and hackers in particular. Secretive
hackers being the worst.)
<-
It's interesting to me how double standardized (is that a phrase
in english?) the concept of privacy is in general.
One seems to have to do some snooping to make sure one's privacy
and security is assured. In doing so one is invading the privacy
of others.
I have met very few privacy purists. Most tend to feel that privacy
is not a general responsibility of the collective to assure.
The collective in this sense is either the government, or the people
as a whole.
Phrased another way, most of the privacy advocates I have met and discussed
with seem to feel that what is not protected is fair game. They
lay the burden on the individual to secure his/her own privacy and
scowl at those who are too lazy to do it. (note that this message isn't
signed because I'm too lazy to do it) In addition they seem to snarl at
any attempts to collectivze privacy and make it a function of government
to enforce privacy on the ground that there exists a conflict of interest.
Unfortunately, while there exist SOME tools for the individual today to
provide for his or her own privacy, (stong encryption) many of the other
tools are provided by smaller collectives. (the remailers for example)
Indeed it is a collective of perhaps 2 (the operator of the mailer and
the system admin if seperate) but a collective none the less and one which
the user must rely on. Are remailers then a departure from the "secure
your own privacy" doctrine?
It stands to reason that all remailers should provide for double blind
double encrypted remailing. (Provided you subscribe to the theory,
)
Just as a side note, I tend to think that laying the burden on the
individual is the best approach.
-uni- (Dark)