Re: the rest of the key

[Graham Toal <gtoal@an-teallach.com>]

	> I was just wondering.... If the NSA could get it's hands on half
	>(40) of any particular clipper key, wouldn't that just leave 2^40
	>to compute? Even with brute force, it's trivial  even next to DES.

	"half" is a a random number which is XOR'd with 80 bits.  Both halves
	look random.  The XOR of the two halves is not.

Oh yes, and the guy who is asking the spooks about the technical stuff -
be sure to find out where this 80-bit random number comes from and
where it goes when it's been used...  Anyone who knows the split-pattern
only needs to subvert *one* of the escrow agencies.

G