Re: Remailer Musings

["Philippe Nave" <pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com>]

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Ed Carp writes :
> 
> On Tue, 19 Apr 1994, Philippe Nave wrote:
> 
> > [concern about traceability of messages sent through remailers, and
> >  involvement of remailer operators in investigations]
>
> 
> I disagree with Brad's interpretation.  For example, if I photocopy a 
> book and anonymously snail mail it to people, do you think the postal 
> service is going to take the fall?  Nope - they are just a carrier, and 
> are not responsible for content.  Like the common carriers - they just 
> receive a message and pass it along.  They aren't responsible for message 
> content.  If Brad Templeton's view of the world was the prevailing (or 
> correct) one, then every common carrier in the country, including Ma Bell 
> and the US Postal Service, would not exist, because they would've been 
> sued out of existence long ago.
> 

The analogy comparing an anonymous remailer to the Postal Service breaks
down at a key point, I think. The USPS is not held liable if I Xerox a 
book and mail it to someone, but the Postal Inspectors *are* expected to
cooperate fully with law enforcement interests when such behavior is 
investigated. If we limit the discussion to content alone, there is not
really any difference between an anonymous remailer and Netcom - if I
send something I shouldn't through both systems, neither would logically
be held responsible for the content.

[This distinction was muddled in my original posting; the following is
an attempt to clarify my position. A thousand pardons...]

The anonymous remailer is supposed to be (as its name implies) a method
for transferring data from one point to another with no identifying 
labels as to the origin of the data. Removing the original poster's 
ID and (essentially) replacing it with the remailer operator's ID 
does not accomplish a whole lot, in my view. When questions are raised
about objectionable postings, the Internet community actually follows
the 'Post Office' analogy closely, expecting the 'postmaster' to assist
in the investigation. *This* is where the remailer operator becomes a 
martyr; the very nature of the remailer paradigm precludes the collection
of data that would aid the investigation. We can debate whether it is
reasonable for the Internet community to expect this sort of help, but
we ourselves saw nothing wrong with asking (for example) Detweiler's 
postmaster to get his ravings off the Net. 

So, then, the remailer operator must walk an ethical tightrope - since
the remailer is not truly anonymous (in the sense that messages simply
*cannot* be traced), the operator must balance the ideal of anonymous
communication against the realities of Internet connectivity. If I
want to communicate anonymously without worrying about attacks on the
remailer operator, it would seem that *complete* anonymity is required.
Then, messages could be encrypted and bounced among remailers without
exposure to the 'Achilles' Heel' address of the last remailer in the
chain.

- -- 
........................................................................
Philippe D. Nave, Jr.   | Strong Crypto: Don't leave $HOME without it!
pdn@dwroll.dw.att.com   | 
Denver, Colorado USA    | PGP public key: by arrangement.

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