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Cypherpunks write articles
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Cypherpunks should write articles to local newspapers and journals to
undermine the Clipper Chip's political and bustiness support. Here is
a article that I was able to get published in a local computer users
Journal (HAL PC USERS JOURNAL). The net is already saturated with
information on this issue. It is time to attack more conventional
media. Others cypherpunks could write other articles to local
newspapers and journals.
The actual article is quoted with ">" I have added my commentary.
This Section was seen by the Editor only and was not published.
>(C) Copyright Paul Elliott 1994
>All rights reserved.
But it can be sent to the recipients of the cypherpunks and extropians mailing
list.
>
>I have used the TeXisms {\bf } and {\it }to denote text that should be
>placed in boldface or italics.
>
>Paul Elliott
>3987 South Gessner #224
>Houston Texas 77063
>Email: [email protected]
>
>------------------------------Cut Here with a Chainsaw.------------------------------
Title
>The Clipper Chip Initiative
>What is the Clipper Chip Initiative?
>
In this section I do set up so the reader will know what the heck I am
talking about! I take a few shots at targets of opportunity along the
way.
>Encryption is a method of scrambling messages and files to keep them
>private. Governments and corporations have used encryption from time
>immemorial, but recently strong encryption has become available to
>individuals. Phil Zimmerman's freeware program Pretty Good Privacy
>(PGP) (available almost anywhere) provides a convenient way for
>individuals to encrypt and decrypt messages and files. Voice
>scramblers have existed for a long time, but in the past, analog
>scramblers were not cryptographically strong. That is, if a government
>or a corporation really wanted to overhear your scrambled speech, it
>could do so. Now, technology has advanced to the point that strong
>encryption of voice communications is becoming feasible at a price
>which will be affordable for the masses.
>
>The Clipper Chip Initiative is the "Escrowed Encryption Standard"
>which has been proposed as a standard for encrypted voice
>communications by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
>(NIST). This as a standard for a hardware chip which was designed by
>the National Security Agency (NSA) for NIST. This design was probably
>done illegally because the Computer Security Act of 1987 explicitly
>gives NIST the responsibility for standards-making for the
>unclassified governmental and commercial sectors. In NSA internal
>documents, the chip was originally called the "trapdoor" chip.
Use the NSA's own terminology to slime the chip.
>
>The plan features "key escrow," an arrangement whereby the government
>keeps the keys to decrypt all the information encrypted by any of the
>chips and then promises not to use them without legal authorization.
>
Many people have an instinctive distrust of promises.
The set up about the difference between a Clipper Chip Law and
the actual Clipper Chip Act is necessary so that the reader
will understand my comments about John Gilmore's freedom of
information act request later.
>The administration plans to implement the Clipper proposal entirely
>using authority that it believes it already has. It does not plan to
>get Congress to pass any new laws in implementing the Clipper
>standard. This is why the proposal is called the "Clipper Chip {\bf
>Initiative}" rather than the "Clipper Chip {\bf Act}". This is
>necessary because it is not clear that any Clipper proposal could pass
>Congressional muster. Last year the "Digital Telephony Act" went down
>in flames when it could not find even one Congress-person willing to
>sponsor it. (The "Digital Telephony Act" is the FBI's proposal to have
>the phone companies tap everyone's phone for the FBI with the cost
>being born by the people that pay phone bills. Of course, the FBI
>promises not to use this ability to record phone conversations without
>a proper court order.)
>
In this section I try to convince the typical business man or
corporate buyer that the Clipper Chip is a bad business decision.
>The Clipper Chip is Bad Business.
>
>The Clipper Chip is a bad business decision for several reasons:
>
I found this list of Clipper Chip opponents in a magazine article.
>The Clipper Chip is not likely to become an Industry Standard in the
>sense of being widely used. It has been opposed by many respected
>industry leaders such as Lotus' CEO Jim Manzi, WordPerfect CEO Adrian
>Rietveid, Microsoft's Bill Gates, Ray Noorda of Novell, Carol Bartz of
>Autodesk, Aldus CEO Paul Brainerd, and Intergraph's Jim Meadlock, to
>name just a few. With this kind of opposition, it is not likely that
>the proposed standard will gain wide acceptance.
>
In this section I invoke the latent hatred of the IRS and regulatory
agencies, without suggesting that the reader may be contemplating any
extra-legal need for strong encryption. (Which he very well may be,
but I did not say it.)
>There are many situations in which it is legitimate and legal to keep
>secrets from the government. For example, while negotiating with the
>IRS or regulatory agencies, you are entitled to privacy while you are
>communicating with your lawyer. However, if you are not able to make
>the required privacy a reality, you may be at a disadvantage when
>dealing with these agencies. Of course, you have the government's
>promise that it will never use its escrowed keys without proper
>authorization, but many people prefer not to rely on promises.
>
I use the drug war to point out security vulnerabilities of the Clipper
Chip.
>The Clipper Chip renders you vulnerable to industrial espionage. To
>understand this, consider the hundreds of "drug war" investigations in
>progress across the country. If the Clipper were to become widely used
>by the targets of these investigations, it would be necessary to
>obtain the "escrow keys" for the suspects of these investigations and
>those of the people that they habitually call. Thus, there would be
>long lists of "escrow keys" that would have to be obtained for these
>investigations. An industrial spy could obtain an "escrow key" for a
>clipper device used by the competitor by bribing someone to add the
>key to one of these long lists. The key could then decrypt his
>competitor's communications. While many in law enforcement would
>refuse to participate in such a scheme, it only takes one person who
>is susceptible to a bribe to make this plan work. "And who is so firm
>as can not be seduced?" The intelligence agencies will say that their
>compartmentalization is such as to prevent this from happening. But
>compartmentalization did not prevent Aldrich Ames from passing to the
>Russians many secrets which he theoretically could not have even
>known.
>
I use John Gilmore's Freedom of information act request to spread fear
uncertainty and doubt.
>John Gilmore's Freedom of Information Act request may force the
>government to release all of the "escrowed" keys rendering all Clipper
>Chips worthless. To see how this is so, it is well to remember that
>the government plans to implement its Clipper proposal without passing
>any new laws. Since the government did not attempt to introduce any
>new laws, there was no opportunity to adjust the Freedom of
>Information Act with respect to the Clipper Chip. The Freedom of
>Information Act does not include any exemptions for secret government
>databases containing Clipper Chip keys. If the government were to
>classify these databases, then it would become illegal to distribute
>the classified information to law enforcement officers, most of whom
>do not have the required clearance. John Gilmore has previously won
>Freedom of Information Act cases relating to cryptography, so there is
>a good prospect that he will win this one as well. If this should
>happen all Clipper Chip keys would be exposed.
>
Suggest that businesses wait for strong encryption.
>The industry is likely to create a viable alternative to Clipper which
>does not have Clipper's deficiencies. Phil Zimmerman, the author of
>Pretty Good Privacy, is working on a voice encryption system using sound
>cards and a software implementation. There will probably soon be
>hardware systems coming to market that feature Public Key encryption.
>Systems that can be used internationally will probably come from abroad,
>as the administration is choking domestic encryption products with its
>inane "munitions export control laws."
>
In this section is aimed at the typical ACLU Democratic Party civil
liberties types. I try to disgust them with the policy of the Clinton
Administration. The hated (by Democratic liberal civil libertarians)
Rush Limbaugh makes the perfect foil.
>Political Analysis
>
>Why does the Clinton Administration support the Clipper Chip
>Initiative at the same time that the supposedly "right wing" Rush
>Limbaugh opposes it? Do not most ACLU members vote Democratic? Is it
>not supposed to be the "right-wingers" that want to limit our civil
>liberties? Is down up? Is up down? Are dogs and cats going to start
>living together? What can explain this astounding political reversal?
>
>It is possible to account for Rush's position. Rush has been forced to
>take an interest in First Amendment issues because of the proposed
>revival of the "Fairness Act" which has been viewed as covert way to
>flush Rush. Also, Rush is a Republican. The Democrats control both
>the Legislative and Executive branches of government. The Clipper Chip
>Initiative proposes to increase government power in a way that could
>be used against Republicans. Certainly, it would be more difficult
>for Rush to oppose the Clipper Chip if George Bush was still proposing
>it.
>
I compare Clinton to Nixon, who also liked to bug phones.
>It is more difficult to explain the position of the Clinton
>Administration. Al Gore likes to talk about the administration's
>proposals for the Information Superhighway, but he seems very
>uncomfortable when discussing the Clipper Chip. A standard whose sole
>{\it raison d'etre} is to enable the government to tap everyone's
>phones seems positively Nixonesqe.
>
Moynihan originally used the phrase "boob bait for the bubbas
with respect to the people that support so-called welfare-reform.
ACLU types typically feel superior to these people, so I suggest
that they themselves are being taken for the same ride that the
bubba's are being taken on.
>Politicians may pay lip-service to civil liberties when addressing
>the ACLU, but their own true agenda is their own personal power
>and advancement. As government continues to demand more and more
>control over people's lives, more draconian methods must be used
>to meet resistance. The Democratic Party's nominal support for
>civil liberties may be only "boob bait for the Bubbas"
>in the charming words of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan.
>
This section gets smiles from those who already oppose Clinton,
but I may be pushing the envelope too far, and risk loosing
Clinton's supporters.
>There is another possible explanation for the position of the Clinton
>administration. The intelligence agencies like to tap people's
>phones, but they also love to bug people's bedrooms. Perhaps the
>Clinton administration finds itself in a position in which it has no
>choice but to agree to the requests of the intelligence agencies.
>
(This was written before the latest flaw in clipper's escrow
feature was found. If I were writting today, I would certainly
use it to show government incompetence and hence weakness in the
Clipper system.)
Many cypherpunks are intelligent and literate people. If I can
write and get an article like this published, even if in an
admittedly minor journal, other cypherpunks should be able to
write even better articles that undermine the clipper chip,
and get them published in more important journals.
- --
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Paul Elliott Telephone: 1-713-781-4543
[email protected] Address: 3987 South Gessner #224
Houston Texas 77063
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