Re: Crime and punishment in cyberspace - 3 of 3

[koontzd@lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz )]

>If we accept the need for wiretapping, than the only problem is to find a way
>to make Clipper/DTII as protective of privacy as current analog-tapping laws;
>as inconvenient as current analog tapping. If we accept the need for
>wiretapping, we can find such ways. Variants of Micali's fair crypto; an open,
>publicly available no-trapdoor algorithm; a requirement that, as with primitive
>exchanges, DTII'd ones would still have to be visited by LEOs to work a tap,
>etc. We can then respond to the various (non-serious) calls from Freeh, Denning
>et al for an 'alternative'.

The problem is that the Genie of strong cryptography is out of the bag.  A
large part of the internet community is capable of implementing strong
crypto.  Given a publicly available no-trapdoor algorithm, requiring the
'source' be visited, denies wiretap capabilities.  The LEO follows the
flow of information further and further upstream/down stream, noting that
encryption is used.  Eventually one follows the communications media
directly to someones office/residence/car/pocket (which implies bugs
instead of wiretaps).  On the pro-wiretap side this is unacceptable.
On the anti-wiretap side, what we see is the result of haggling over
the price, provisions for wire and control records, which provide for
fishing expeditions in the event the traffic is not particularly
enlightening.

As a corallary, allowing wiretapping but making them extremely expensive
and dangerous to use could be explored - again haggling over the price.
One can imagine making the LEO requesting a tap personally at risk for
draconian retribution in terms both civil and criminal.

It is unclear whether the antis should be prepared to negotiate at all.
There is historical precedence by the U.S. supreme court to suggest that
the right to privacy is absolute.  The problem is that contrary to the
Radio Act of 1934 and various other statutes covering public utility
provided communications, the right to privacy is not being respected
for electronic forms of expression.

Before negotiating to give anything away, this issue should be satisfied.
Hence the direction of a lot of groups like EFF, etc.

The arguments go that no one has an expectation of privacy on unprotected
media.  The answer to that is to use strong crypto.  The second level
argument is that this denies the 'traditional' monitoring for law
enforcement purposes of communications that had no expectation of privacy.
Well I expect privacy with strong encryption.  Tough teat.

But then criminals will have privacy!  (It may be their constitutional right.)

I'm not particularly shocked to hear that someone may commit a crime in
private.

There should be compelling proof to show the needs of society overide
the rights of the individual (in a republic).  The arguments put forth
by the pro-wiretap sides are inadequate to that determination, relying
instead of emotional appeals and other propaganda.