Cantwell bill outcome

[Dave Otto <dave@marvin.jta.edd.ca.gov>]

The following post to 'eff.talk presents what, IMO, is one of the most
plausible explanations for the ITAR crypto restrictions.  I guess I'm
not nearly devious enough to work for a TLA.  I believe NO request for
export of the App. Crypto disk will be approved as long as this type of
(semi-hidden) agenda is driving the descisions.

However, with the (continuing) spread of PGP, even this argument is bogus:-)

---------- begin forwarded message -----------

Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk
From: Liudvikas Bukys  <bukys@cs.rochester.edu>
Subject: My conversation with Greg Frasier (House Intelligence Committee)
Sender: bukys@cs.rochester.edu (Liudvikas Bukys)
Organization: University of Rochester Computer Science Dept
Date: Fri, 17 Jun 1994 14:53:38 -0400

I decided to call around Washington a bit about the unanimous House
Intelligence Committee vote against relaxation of export controls on
encryption.

I ended up speaking to Greg Frasier, an aide at the House Intelligence
Committee.  He basically reiterated the case re national security and
legitimate needs of law enforcement.

FYI, reportedly, the report is due (from the President) 150 days after
the enactment of the bill.

A couple of interesting statements from Mr. Frasier (paraphrased -- I
didn't record the conversation!):

	That the arguments they are hearing about American companies
	are unproven, and that no single case of a problem has been
	documented (in his view).  In particular, US companies are
	allowed some export to the non-US subsidiaries and to financial
	institutions, so what's the problem?

!	While they are aware that software for secure encryption is
!	available from non-US, they are making a best effort to prevent
!	a standard from emerging, while hoping that some escrowed
!	encryption scheme will gain acceptance.

I was surprised by the unanimous vote, but he was not.  He says that there
has been a lot of discussion on this on the committee, but the security/enforce
  ++ment concerns generally prevail.

My impression is that the range of possible outcomes went from outright
rejection of export reform (at worst), to a request for a report from the
President (at best).  I would guess that as long as there is any hope of
promulgating government key escrow, they will do their best to discourage
the adoption of non-escrowed strong cryptography.

Liudvikas Bukys
<bukys@cs.rochester.edu>

        Dave Otto -- dave@marvin.jta.edd.ca.gov -- daveotto@acm.org
    "Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain!"     [the Great Oz]
    {I *DO* have a life, it's just that my kids are using it right now!}