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RE: MAIL: chained remailing strategy
- To: [email protected]
- Subject: RE: MAIL: chained remailing strategy
- From: [email protected]
- Date: Fri, 1 Jul 1994 18:55:08 -0700
- Comments: This message is NOT from the person listed in the Fromline. It is from an automated software remailing service operating atthat address. Please report problem mail to <[email protected]>.
- Sender: [email protected]
Hal Finney wrote:
> Here are the times at which my remailer has received messages
> over the past week. (This is the only form of log which I keep,
> except for messages titled "DEATH TO BLACKNET".) In return for
> this information, please provide a histogram showing usage as a
> function of time of day. Thanks - Hal Finney
You're on, Hal. Thanks for the work you put into that, and I'll
see if I can whip up a program to produce a histogram ... well,
at least in tabular form. Thanks for the challenge... In fact,
if you want, I can send you the source code (in "C"), privately.
This mention of "DEATH TO BLACKNET" sounds intriguing. Is this
some sort of abusive/harassing message you're trying to track
down? With encrypted chaining available to hide the actual
subject until the last link, it would seem that the sender is
either naive, or else WANTS the Subject: line itself to send some
sort of "statement". (What is "BLACKNET", BTW?)
This brings up a related question, however. How often, if at
all, are you asked to help trace down the source of a message
handled by your remailer? Under what circumstances would you
cooperate with such a request?
I've noticed that you have a 510 bit public key for your
remailer. Did you choose the shorter length to speed things up,
or what? I tend to use a remailer with a longer key as my FIRST
link in the chain. Maybe it's overkill, but why not?
And, finally, as a chained remailer user, I've read the periodic
"status reports" by fingering "[email protected]" and your
remailer must certainly rank as one of the promptest and most
reliable. In fact, I think I'll include you *SOMEWHERE* on the
chain for this reply... <g>