Re: Why triple encryption instead of split+encrypt?

[solman@MIT.EDU]

> The cryptanalytic approach is simple:
> 
>      1) Split the known plaintext, P, with the splitting algorithm, into
>         P0 and P1.
> 
>      2) Apply known-plaintext attack to P0 and C0 to determine key K0.
> 
>      3) Apply known-plaintext attack to P1 and C1 to determine key K1.

Clearly, if you have access to P0, P1; C0 and C1 this attack crushes the
algorithm. In most books I've seen, it is assumed that you do not have
access to this. For example, it is not considered a liability that somebody
hacking a DES encrypted message after 8 rounds could have a _relatively_
easy time hacking it.

Nonetheless, your cryptanalytic algorithm makes clear an additional
constraints that must be placed on the system which I had not realized:

From the algorithm, the plaintext, and the cypher text, in must not be
possible to reconstruct both the plaintext, and the cyphertext for either
half of the message.

To that end I would suggest the improvement of making the splitting
operation dependent on the keys.

One of many possible implementations: Do a simple splitting operation
like the one johndo suggested. Concatenate the two halves. Then hash
the concatenation of the two keys. Concatenate the negation of the hash
to the hash. Then multiplex the bits of the message to message #0 and
message #1 based on the bits in the resultant string of bits, repeating
the string until all the message bits are allocated. This prevents them
from splitting the problem in two thus, I believe, requiring the full
attack, giving arbitrarilly strong protection based on your favorite
fully analyzed encryption algorithm while only minimally decreasing speed
versus the single encryption (20-30%) and maintaining the same size. Am
I wrong?