Re: CYPHERPUNKS TO THE RESCUE

[Pierre Uszynski <pierre@shell.portal.com>]

Sorry for following up on my own post, but when I said:

> The reason some current units may not be secure is probably the
> usual: the manufacturers are not interested in what the customers
> don't want and the customers don't want what the manufacturers have
> never told them could (or should) be done. And politicians are more
> interested in legislative action than in suggesting their constituents
> do not buy junk.

On the other hand, our leaders may be interested in promoting
technology and the American Way. To this end, NIST (in close collaboration
with NSA and the FBI) could be mandated to assign a committee to prepare
a report detailing the need for further study on the Information
Highway Garage Door Opener Voluntary Standard (IHGDOVS, sorry).

Clearly National Security would mandate the use of an escrow system,
and of secret algorithms, but as phone coverage of the country (and
soon cellular coverage) if pretty good, key escrow would not impose
that much of a burden on the taxpayer.

The door unit would be a tamper proof, reverse engineering proof unit
back-end programmed in Fort Meade to hold the escrow serial number.
Its full alphanumeric keyboard (anything less would be un-american)
could not be used to enter a new pass-phrase unless a phone connection
exists back to headquarters. 

Because of the escrow system, there would then be no objection to
the use of a really secure system (with full length 500 bit keys). And
because "compute cycles are cheap" voice recognition could be added
on the remote to foil crude attacks in the line of stealing the silly
thing. All this resulting in a definite strategic and economic advantage
for the US and US companies.

Pierre.
pierre@shell.portal.com