Re: Clarification of my remarks about Netscape

["Perry E. Metzger" <perry@imsi.com>]

"Kipp E.B. Hickman" says:
> > (1) Netscape plays very fast and loose with HTML.
> 
> This has nothing to do with security...

No, but its a Bad Thing.

> > (2) The Netscape Secure Sockets proposal has an extremely poor security
> >  model.
> >     It is not an end-to-end security model, but rather relies on transport
> >     level security, which is in my view dangerously inadequate for reasons
> >     which should be obvious to most of the folks on this list.
> 
> Clearly I'm an idiot. Explain it to me. And while you are at it, why
> don't you email me your comments on the spec?

HTTP, like SMTP, is only a transport for underlying documents. The
underlying documents are the things people wish to secure, not the
transport layer.  By securing only the transport, you make it possible
for people to get pages that are forged, although they can be sure of
what machine delivered them (which isn't significant). Your system is,
for instance, useless in a proxy HTTP daemon environment.

Actually, securing the communications as well is important for
privacy, but that should be done via IPSP, not some new, incompatible,
mechanism.

> >	It is also
> >     tied directly to the RSA certification hierarchy.

I'll point out that X.509 is widely loathed in the internet community
-- its X.509 that caused PEM to fall flat on its face and die.

> This is an outright lie. We don't use TIPEM. You could build a
> conformant SSL implementation using RSAREF and the freeware IDEA
> cipher code. As for a barrier to competition.

RSAREF versions of the code can't be used commercially. RSA won't
license people to do stuff on their own -- unless you have significant
pull, you have to buy TIPEM or BSAFE from them and use THEIR code.

> So what else is new? We
> all have barriers to overcome before we can compete. Should we get rid of
> TCP/IP as a barrier to using the web?

Well, TCP/IP is available for free, but thats a horse of a different
color. I don't particularly like your security model, but I don't
object that strenuously to your use of TIPEM qua TIPEM. I do strongly
object to X.509, which is based on technologies entirely alien to the
internet. How do I look up an X.509 certificate in the DNS? Now, given
the Eastlake and Kaufman DNS security system, you can put keys in the
DNS if you use DNS names, but X.509 uses abortive ISO distinguished
names which are utterly unmappable into the DNS.

As for your "peer review", I'll note that it was done extensively by
RSADSI folks, who aren't entirely unbiased about technologies...

.pm