On criticizing SSL, and insecure transport layers

[rishab@dxm.ernet.in]

kipp@mcom.com:
> Is [SSL] insecure? If so, how?
> 
> Is there some cipher techonology that it absolutely must support? If
> so, which one? why?

While I'm not going to say anything about SSL's qualities as a secure 
transport layer as such (I've not looked at it carefully enough) I think 
that the criticisms are on larger issues.

1. Standards - the reinventing the wheel criticism; if other methods for
more or less the same thing exist (and swIPe source has been around for all
to test to their hearts' content) why try a new one? This point seems to have
mutated into general criticism of NCom's attitude to / knowledge of IETF
proceedings and the technology

2. Security - the basic insecurity of _any_ transport layer. "If Netscape
had to come up with a new secure protocol, why did they choose the transport
layer?" The transport layer is insecure because: it is less under the control
of a user, it happens 'automagically'; it is at a lower level and so generally
implemented by central authorities - sysadmins etc, and does not suit the
web of trust model (nor does X.509) which is much better outside 
dictatorships; it is provided by the telco or net service provider who, as 
I suggested earlier, are prone to arm-twisting by the authorities, whether
by legislation, or while 'cooperating'.

Transport layer security does not provide data authentication, it only
provides server authentication; nor does it provide data security and privacy
between users, it only provides network security.

To rebut Kipp's favourite justification, insecure transmission of passwords:
transport layer security does _not_ improve password security/privacy, but
only ensures that once a plaintext password is received by the transport
layer, usually at a service provider, then it will not be intercepted. Secure
transmission of passwords could (but as far as I know is not widely) be 
implemented at the client level, through DH handshaking or something, which
would ensure a completely secure and _private_ transaction.

Transport layer security is nice because it is conveniently automatic and
transparent, but it can lead to a false sense of security for precisely that
reason.

Of course these are quintessentially Cypherpunk objections. A bank, or
Singapore, would be quite comfortable with such a system for internal networks.


"We know everything about you that we need to know" - Coleta Brueck, IRS
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rishab Aiyer Ghosh                                "In between the breaths is
rishab@dxm.ernet.in                                  the space where we live"
rishab@arbornet.org                                        - Lawrence Durrell
Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410  
Voicemail +91 11 3760335                 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA