Re: How do I know if its encrypted?

[Ben.Goren@asu.edu]

Paul, I think we're after two different objectives here. You want Alice to
be sure that Dave can't read her file; I want Dave to be sure that he can't
read Alice's files.

Alice should worry only about her privacy: if she doesn't want Dave to know
what she's sending, she should encrypt her file in a way that Dave cannot
break.

Dave certainly doesn't want to know what Alice is sending him, because he
might have to answer to a Grand Jury if he did. My protocal makes it very
difficult for Dave to gain any useful knowledge about Alice's files. Dave
does this not as a courtesy to Alice, but for those three wonderful
letters, CYA.

Of course, any data haven worth paying for will offer lots of neat
features, like PGP support, anonymous file drops, and all other sorts of
goodies. But that does little good if Alice can trick Dave into selling
child pornography.

Douglass Floyd asked, "How do I know if [be certain that] it's encrypted?"
Unfortunately, I'm pretty sure the answer is, "You decrypt it." My protocol
at least delays the decryption until it's [hopefully] too late to matter.

b&

[Here's part of the thread; nothing new follows.]

At 11:00 PM 1/13/95, Paul J. Ste. Marie wrote:
>At 10:07 PM 1/13/95, Ben Goren wrote:
>> ... Alice hashes her file and uses that hash as the key to encrypt the file.
>>She sends the file to Dave, and sends the original hash when she wants it
>>back. Dave decrypts, and confirms the hash.
>>
>>Unfortunately, this still doesn't quite close the loop--Dave knows the
>>contents of the file once Alice sends the key. It does, however, make it
>>very difficult for Dave to know anything about Alice's file. ...
>
>This seems overly complicated.  If Dave has a known public key, then Alice
>should be able to hash her file, sign the hash, encrypt (the hash, her
>public key, and the file) with Dave's public key, and (anonymously) sends
>the result to Dave's (encrypted) address.  Dave then decrypts, verifies the
>sig, and stores the file, hash, and PK together, indexed by the hash.
>
>When Alice wants the file back, she signs (the hash and her encrypted return
>address), encrypts the result with Dave's key, and sends it off.  Dave
>decrypts the request, fetchs the public key based on the decrypted hash,
>verifies the signature, encrypts the file with Alice's provided public key,
>and sends it back to the encrypted return address.
>
>To avoid Dave's knowing the file contents, Alice can encrypt it before the
>described protocol and decrypt it afterwards.  The protocol is subject to a
>replay attack, but the result of the replay would cause the file to be sent
>to the original sender and not to the replayer.
>
>The signed hash in the first step prevents people from spamming Dave with
>files that have Alice's public key.  Alice only requires an encrypted
>address and public key for Dave, and Dave validates the retrieval request
>against the public sent in the first step.
>
>    --Paul J. Ste. Marie
>      pstemari@well.sf.ca.us, pstemari@erinet.com

--
Ben.Goren@asu.edu, Arizona State University School of Music
 Finger ben@tux.music.asu.edu for PGP public key ID 0xCFF23BD5.