Remailer exit points

[pstemari@erinet.com (Paul J. Ste. Marie)]

Y'know, after some thought, some of the concepts I made regarding data 
havens with anonymous locations might well apply to making exit-point 
remailers that are relatively immune from outside pressure.  Given a network 
of entry-point remailers with well-known public keys, you could advertise an 
exit-point remailer by only giving out encrypted address blocks for use with 
various well-known entry-point remailers and a public key.  The exit-point 
remailer could then substitute some random From: address and path entries to 
spoof the exit-point remailer's location.  The remailer's actual location 
would only be known by the entry point remailers, and since their 
involvement is stripped by the exit-point remailers, no one would know who 
they are to complain to them.

The spoofed exit-point remailer location could be handled by disposable MX 
entries, of the sort discussed here earlier, if it is deemed desireable to 
make the From: address valid.  The remailer operator could get the actual 
complaints, to deal with as he would.

    --Paul J. Ste. Marie
      pstemari@well.sf.ca.us, pstemari@erinet.com