Re: Stego Standards Silly ? (

[lmccarth@cs.umass.edu (L. McCarthy)]

Monster@FAmend.Com writes:
>   Not obvious at all. You encrypt and sign as usual, stego the resultant
> output, and perhaps include in the stego routines some kind of CRC or
> hash if you like. But the point is that the signature still works to
> indicate whether the message was tampered with or not.
> 
>   If we posit a MITM, he can tamper with cyphertext =or= stegotext, but
> he can't defeat the signature. I would recieve a GIF which my stego
> software would turn into a file that PGP would puke on, telling me that
> Someone Is Messing With My Mail.

Sure -- for most message passing applications, tampering in transit would
also lead to noticeably corrupted cleartext, when the stegoed ciphertext
is decrypted. Again, PGP pukes, or perhaps Stealth PGP gives me something
obliterated when it decrypts. See my comments below, however.

>   I would not, of course, be able to reveal this fact directly. However,
> I could ask my correspondent to re-send the GIF, and when it comes out
> different in EVERY SINGLE LSB, I have proof of tampering.

Well, you could do that regardless of what is or isn't stegoed into the
carrier image. I'm arguing that perhaps the govt. (or whomever) will be
far less sympathetic to such in-stego-channel evidence of doctoring. 

I still see an obstacle to this approach, though. If we want to try to
foil traffic analysis, then we need people routinely to dispatch ghost
messages. Some of these should go to people with whom the sender is not trying
to communicate. When Karen gets a GIF in the mail, she needs to decide whether
its LSBs are significant (semantically speaking :) or not. If they decrypt
into something meaningful, QED; if not, what to do ?  "Sufficiently
advanced communication is indistinguishable from noise" is a double-edged
sword, after all. Establishing that communication is really being attempted
is trickier under these conditions.

I think I need to clarify my threat model. I'm positing a scenario in which
transmission of ciphertext and stegoed anything is illegal, but transmission
and use of "conspicuous" digital signatures is legal. Furthermore, the govt.
sanitizes the LSBs of digital images for our protection, perhaps distorting
a mean of X% of the LSBs of a mean of Y% of transmitted images. Out-of-stego-
channel checksummation would IMHO be crucial in such a situation.  

-Futplex <futplex@pseudonym.com>   "A kiss and a hug and a couple of f*cks: 
                                    being in love really sucks" -Meryn Cadell