re: big dictionaries

[Chris Gorsuch <chrisg@chrisg.itg.ti.com>]

Bill,
   Good point about using a "slow" hash algorithm.  A "dictionary" attack on
the hash should fail because, in order to currently use the password the old
password had to not be in the dictionary in the first place.  However "keyspace"
attacks (brute force) would still be quite feasible.  Would probably want to
put something similiar to a salt in there to help increase the keyspace.
   Keep in mind that the only reason I suggested a hash at all is to prevent an
admin who, in general, would not go through the effort to replace login/password
or install a sniffer to get your password, but might be "unnecessarily" tempted
by having easy to access passwords stored in plaintext on the server (still 
in a file only the admin could read).  Basically just as a method to keep
honest people honest.
   To verify that a user wasn't using a variation on the original, you would 
want to only store the hash of the original, but do hashes of the variants on
the "new" password and compare with the stored hash of the old password.  And
of course, only store a password AFTER it has been changed.
   Really paranoid admins should use challenge/response/one-time passwords 
with/or kerberos.

chris gorsuch
chrisg@ti.com