Re: a hole in PGP

[Ray Cromwell <rjc@clark.net>]

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> >>>>> "warlord" == Derek Atkins <warlord@mit.edu> writes:
> 
>  warlord> This is where you are very wrong.  I am not saying that "if
>  warlord> you can't find any holes it must be secure".  What I am
>  warlord> saying is that the source is available, and thousands of
>  warlord> people have looked at the source, and none of them have
>  warlord> found any holes in it.
> 
> While I largely disagree with Dr. Cohen's conclusions, I do think we
> should extinguish the "Examine the source!" mantra.
> 
> I find it surprising that people so familiar with public key
> cryptography would be reassured by the argument, "Here, this algorithm
> has been examined by thousands and nobody has found a trap door."
> Public key cryptography demonstrates that it is possible, in
> principle, to construct an algorithm with a trap door that nobody else
> is *ever* going to find.  I wonder whether Rivest could construct a
> hash function which only he could invert...  :-)

  That's a neat metaphor, but it doesn't always apply. It shouldn't
apply to algorithms which are primitive recursive. Elementary
algorithms like multiprecision add, sub, multiply, divide, modmult,
and modexp (the basis of public key encryption) are all provably
correct and all terminate. (the basis is polynomial operators over a
ring) It is possible to verify the implementation (assuming the
correctness of the compiler). Now there could be a "factoring"
trapdoor in RSA, but that's a trapdoor not in the implementation of
PGP, but in the algorithm itself. RSA-in-4-lines-perl is probably
provably correct.  To guard against trapdoors in PGP, you should
verify the correctness of the PRNG, Key Generator, and that no private
key bits or session key bits are leaked. I would suspect this could be
difficult, but approximations could be determined to within a high
degree of confidence.

-Ray