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Digital cash project? Re: The End of the Ecash Trial?




>The only way to preserve the market would appear to be providing an
>ecash-for-ecash exchange with a new bank, presumably a licensee of the
>Digicash software. Such a bank could, out of little more than good
>will and a desire to kick-start a new e-currency, offer to exchange c$
>for the new ecash. Or, perhaps we just shrug our shoulders, kiss our
>hardly-earned Cyberbuck goodbye, and mumble about how it was fun while
>it lasted.

Well I might be interested in setting up such a scheme, but I'm not sure
that the Chaumian Annonymity guarantees could be provided as is. This is 
because of Chaum's patent on blind signatures.

There are schemes which offer weaker annonymity and also schemes which provide 
for faster movement of currency.

The scheme I am currently looking at employs both symmetric and asymmetric 
keying to provide for fast transfers of cash after a connection is set up. The 
mode of payment is of the fraction of cents per page type so RSA is too 
expensive.

Who would be interested in such a trial? Who would be interested in writing 
code? There are complications if the Web consortium is involved since we are 
obliged to provide code to our members one month in advance of the official 
release. But that is for source I beleive, I don't think that there would be a 
problem with trial users or with exchanging code with collaborators. After the 
one month period all consortium code becomes copyright but freely avaliable for 
use for any purpose, its the X consortium contract in fact.


Cyberbucks could be siphoned out of the Chaum system by simply agreeing to 
exchange e-cash for whatever the new currency is. It would also be possible to 
go in the other direction perhaps, "I promise to pay the bearer on demand the 
sum of one cyberbuck".

Since most cyberbuck users are looking to control access to a resource its not 
clear that the cyberbuck model is what is needed. It might be possible to deploy 
a resource contention arbitration mechanism which was not convertible. This 
would also avoid many of the regulatory problems of e-cash.


		Phill