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Four Info Threats
URL: http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/forum35.html
Forum, Number 35, July 1995
THE NEXT ENEMY
Martin C. Libicki, National Defense University
[Excerpts]
The Cold War offered military planners considerable
strategic clarity
the threat was known, and the problem was generating a force
structure
of sufficient size and sophistication to counter it. Today's
military
threats are varied and, for the most part, well below the
level that
even a shrinking U.S. force can handle comfortably. Threats
ten to
twenty years out, however, must be taken seriously because
of the long
time required to complete a major systems acquisition; to
develop,
test, and institutionalize new doctrine; and to accomplish
the
organizational innovations necessary to use both
effectively.
Future threats may be divided into four categories: peers,
bullies,
terrorism, and chaos. ...
Peers
Few planners think it likely that the next twenty years will
see a
reemergence of a nation that can pose a challenge to U.S.
military
power as broadly as the Soviet Union did. However, at least
two
countries (Russia and China) could conceivably be peer
adversaries at
the strategic level of nuclear weapons, space, and
information
systems. ...
Another avenue of future competition may be information
warfare. Can
or should the United States hold other nations'
participation in the
world economy at risk? The United States might be able to
shut down
another nation's banking system but not without risk of
collateral
damage to the global banking system. Can physical war be
replaced by a
survival contest among rival information systems under
attack? Perhaps
the United States should concentrate on developing defensive
systems.
The United States has the biggest stones, but also the most
glass in
its house. ...
A world of peer strategic competition would drive the
military in
familiar directions towards: nuclear forces, satellites and
other
long-range warning systems; tactical ballistic missile
defense systems
(including for allies); perhaps strategic defense systems
and space
attack systems; air defense in general; information warfare
and
security; and robust command-and-control.
Bullies
If the circumstances and logic of the Bottom Up Review hold
true for
two more decades, U.S. armed forces will be sized and
structured
primarily to engage in two simultaneous major regional
contingencies
(MRCs). The usual suspects in such MRCs (e.g., Iran, Iraq,
North
Korea) are presently unsophisticated rogue states that
aspire to
nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Conference
participants believe
that U.S. forces could cope with the challenges of future
conventional
warfare, even if force levels continue to diminish. However,
two
events would make the United States rethink its strategy
nuclear
weapons proliferation, and the sophisticated exploitation of
world
technology markets. ...
Alternatively, an MRC opponent may be able to avoid going to
the
nuclear threshold by a strategy which uses smart munitions,
commercial
command-and-control, and a variety of surveillance
technologies (e.g.,
unmanned aerial vehicles, third-party satellite
surveillance) to exact
damaging casualties on U.S. forces. ...
Against a sophisticated
regional foe, the United States might not want to use
platforms at all
but rely on a combination of stand-off attack forces, and
information-based warfare assets (for giving targeting data
to local
coalition partners), coupled with special operations forces
used for
liaison and other tasks.
Terrorism
Largely because of the limited capability that classical
military
instruments have in coping with terrorism, conference
participants
kept returning to the threat that it may pose to U.S.
national
security. Incidents may range from the use of conventional
explosives
(e.g., what if the van in the World Trade Center explosion
had been
parked in a more vulnerable spot), to nuclear or chemical
weapons,
biological agents, and their analogue in cyberspace
information
warfare.
Devices that can cause terror are getting easier to
manufacture and
transport and harder to detect. The equipment for
replicating
biological agents is inexpensive; the equipment for
replicating
computer agents is even cheaper. Many otherwise third-world
Asian
nations have very large computer-literate cohorts that make
them
potential information warfare powers. ...
Chaos
Over the next two decades, states will continue to fail.
Some failures
may create circumstances (e.g., refugees, malcontents, and
environmental damage) which topple other states. To cope,
the United
States may need a robust capability to conduct peace and
relief
operations. ...
A concentration on peace operations may also be a good
reason to
expand foreign military interactions. Improving
interoperability with
future coalition partners carries many advantages. Yet,
above a
certain technological level of integration, the risk of
exposing
information on U.S. capabilities to what may be temporary
allies has
to be carefully managed.
If countering chaos were the primary mission of the U.S.
armed forces,
then they would have to become lighter and more mobile
(because states
often fail with little warning, and the United States
usually responds
only in extremis). The Army and Marine Corps would have
larger roles,
while the Navy and Air Force would focus on lift. As
emergency
operations become the norm, some functions assigned to
reserve units
may have to be shifted to active ones (e.g., to allow civil
affairs
assets to be used more frequently).