Re: Timing Cryptanalysis Attack

[Adam Shostack <adam@lighthouse.homeport.org>]

	Nope, I'm wrong, as Fred and Simon point out.  The noise makes
finding the times more difficult by some small factor, nothing more.
I'll stop writing these things in the morning. :)

I wrote:

| 	Does the delay have to be random, or does the total time for a
| transacation need to be unrelated to the bits in the secret key?
| Assume that the time added is pseudo-random (and confidential).
| Further, for any non-overlapping group of N transactions, the
| distribution of the times fits some predetermined curve, say a bell
| curve.
| 
| 	We've added a non random number, but since those numbers end
| up being a curve, it would be difficult to determine which transaction
| got which time added to it.  This resembles the 'make them all a
| constant time', but allows us to send out some in a shorter time than
| the maximum (although most transactions should probably take longer
| than the average.)