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Re: kocher's timing attack
From: [email protected] (Sten Drescher)
> On Firewalls, "Jonathan M. Bresler" <[email protected]> said:
> JMB> After
> JMB> several large key signing parties hundreds of known ciphertexts
> JMB> could have been generated using Alice's key--each one a public key
> JMB> of someone else. over several years it piles up. the known
> JMB> ciphertexts can be tested/analyzed to yield Alice's secret key.
> JMB> ouch. ;/
>
> Are you sure about this? It would seem that the same principle
> would then apply to signed messages as well, and I find it a bit hard to
> believe that signing messages would make ones key pair vulnerable.
As Kocher's paper implies, the known ciphertext attack is a TIMING
attack. Simply accumulating known text/signature pairs as you would have
after a "key signing party" does not help. You must know exactly how
much time each signature took.
Hal