Re: blind validation

[Alex Strasheim <cp@proust.suba.com>]

> Chaum's way around it was basically to have some mechanism to give
> each person a unique number of some special form.  There doesn't have
> to be any agency who knows what number each person has (in fact, there
> isn't, in his scheme), but there is a mechanism to assure that one
> person does not get two numbers.  This is sometimes loosely referred to
> as an "is-a-person" credential (although in this specific context it is
> not actually a credential, just an identifier).

If I understand you correctly, this protcol allows Alice to create one and
only one nym that can't be connected to her real identity.  All of 
Alice's transactions can be linked together and to that nym, but there's 
no way to tag Alice with them.

The main difficulty I see with this protocol is that if things go wrong,
they go very wrong.  If Alice slips up once, or if she's compelled to give
herself up, then she loses everything and gets tagged with all of her
transactions.

Does anyone have a pointer to Chaum's paper?

[...]

> So the result in effect is to make it difficult to give away just a
> validation, without also giving away the ability to act as you.  Here
> is an idea about another way to achieve the same thing, closer to
> Alex's example:  Alice gets a blind validation as Alex describes based
> on a simple blind signature.  (Alice hands a blinded number to Bob, he
> signs it, Alice unblinds it, and uses the resulting signed number as
> the validation to, say, access Bob's files.)  We add that Alice puts,
> say, $100 into "escrow", encrypting it with the secret number and
> putting it on some public server.  She proves to Bob that she has done
> this using cut and choose.
> 
> Now if Alice gives away her secret number, anyone using it will be able
> to access Bob's files, but they can also get the $100.  So now it costs
> something for Alice to give away her secret.
> 
> (There are some major problems with this idea, the worst being that Alice
> can extract and spend the $100 right after proving to Bob that she is
> doing what she said, and before publishing her number.  Maybe someone
> could think of some fixes.)

This is a good idea because it addresses one of the big problems with my
protocol, the impossibility of introducing latency. 

But apart from the problem you mentioned above, isn't there a problem with
setting the escrow amount?  Ordinarily, we'd want to set the amount just 
high enough so that Alice doesn't have any interest in cheating.  
Whatever benefit Alice gains will be offset by the penalty.

How do we put a numeric value on the benefits Alice gets from cheating? 
Don't we create a situation in which a rich guy might be perfectly
comfortable with the risk of losing the money, while someone else might
not?