Re: 2047 bit keys in PGP

[futplex@pseudonym.com (Futplex)]

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Sten Drescher writes:
> Since I think that
> increasing the RSA keysize is supposed to double the attack time, if a
> RSA key size of N takes as much time to break as 1 IDEA key, making the
> RSA key N+8 bits makes it better to break the IDEA keys of 200 messages
> rather than the RSA key.
> 
> Does anyone know if there are comparisons of estimates of the
> time to break the IDEA session keys used in PGP vs time to break RSA
> keys of various sizes?

Off the top of my head, the figure I have usually heard quoted puts RSA at
about 100 times slower than your average symmetric key algorithm. So ignoring
key setup, I would expect an extra factor of 100 in the brute forcing time
for RSA over IDEA. 

I don't believe it's worth spending much time worrying about your RSA
key size. If you pick some decent size (1-2k), it's likely that RSA itself
will have been broken, or your key compromised by some other means, before
any direct brute force attack will succeed. 

Futplex <futplex@pseudonym.com>

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