Re: Massey, CEO of Compuserve, on Internet

["Michael C. Peponis" <mianigand@unique.outlook.net>]

> On Wed, 3 Jan 1996, Robert A. Rosenberg wrote:
> 
> > CIS always knows where you are dialing in from. Here is the start of a
> > typical connection (using the Mac Program NAVIGATOR).
> > 
> > >0001NUH
> > >
> > >Host Name:  CIS
> > >
> > >User ID: xxxxx,xxx/INT
> > >Password:
> > >[Navigator: Logged on]
> > >
> > >Welcome to CompuServe Information ServiceT01NUH @38400!
> > >
> > >Last access: Mon, Dec 18, 1995 23:11
> > >Connected to port CIS T01NUH @38400
> > 
> > That NUH identifies that I am calling in via a V34 Node in NYC and the T01
> > says I got the first modem on the Rotory. If CIS wanted to restrict access
> > via the NYS nodes, that NUH would be an adequate flag to trigger this
> > action.
> 
> Wouldn't this require some software routines added to check for this?  I
> expect the decision to build or buy is what CIS is now weighing. Also, I
> would imagine that a German could always call a POP outside the country if
> they wanted to pay for it..... (note that I am still not in favor of the
> action, but these are probably CIS's considerations.)

Well, this could be away for compuserve to cover it's rear in a realy 
slick fashion. If they chose to do it this way.

Most CIS subscribers use their proprietary interface, which puts a 
GUI front end over what is going on with them modem, what they amount 
to are scripts. 

Anyways, CIS could add a script that would check the NUH identifier, 
if it is in Germany, it goes to one newsfeed, if it's outside of 
Germany, it would go to another newsfeed.  They could even market the 
service here in the US to those who like censorship.

What could be "Accidentaly" leaked is a different version of the same 
file, that would not contain the check.

That way, Compuserve could claime that the offending parties tampered 
with the software, and they can not be help responsible for the 
tampering.

I highly doubt that Compuserve would go for such a resolution, but 
it's worth throwing into the mix
 
Regards,
Michael Peponis
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