Re: A brief comparison of email encryption protocols

[Laurence Lundblade <lgl@qualcomm.com>]

At 3:43 AM 2/29/96, Carl Ellison wrote:

>>The Certificate format
>>----------------------
>>It seems possible to pick a certificate format independent of the other
>>issues.  Doing so would allow us to leverage components like we do with
>>other data objects like MIME.  There probably only two major contenders:
>>  * X.509 v3
>>     + broadly supported by standard bodies
>>     + supported by several industries (e.g., banking)
>>     + very rich and flexible
>>     + ASN.1
>>     - ASN.1 (tough for a student to get an ASN.1 compiler)
>>     - complicated
>>  * PGP keys
>>     + widely deployed
>>     + simple to write code for
>>     - difficult to lookup (linear search on key id required)
>>     - too simple to support many trust models and distribution systems
>
>We're proposing a third certificate format.  X.509 is an identity
>certificate, unless one bends it severely.  Signed PGP keys are also
>a kind of identity certificate.  Our proposal is an attribute certificate,
>not an identity certificate.  It is simple to lookup these certs.
>Like X.509, my certs have an Issuing-name and a Subject-name -- but
>they're both cryptographic hashes of public keys.  You can take a portion
>of those hashes [e.g., low order 12 bits] and use it to index a hash table
>of certificates or keys.  The cert is more general than X.509 -- that is,
>it includes all of X.509 and then some [because we don't require some
>binding to a human identity, don't require a Certificate Authority, ...].
>Our first format is RFC822-like -- so it's easy to parse and generate and
>read and use.  It's very rich and flexible.  We're working to make it
>an IETF standard.  It does not use ASN.1 and has none of the baroqueness
>of X.509.
>
>In fact, these certs can be formed as PGP clear-signed messages.

Isn't using a hash as the identifier replicating the key distribution
problem that PGP has or are you including some other data that can be used
to look up the cert?  I think a problem occurs when you have 20 billion of
these certs (two for every person in the year 2010 or such).  A simple hash
into a table isn't going to cut it because you a single database (with
replication?) isn't going to be possible.  Some hierarchical lookup like
DNS is going to be needed. The look ups are needed to check for revocation.

LL